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A growing conflict between the creators and owners of expressive works protected by 
copyright law and the community of users and distributors of those works has 
focused on whether the law is so restrictive that it no longer meets the constitutional 
mandate that intellectual property law should serve to promote the growth and 
development of useful and expressive works.  Has the scope of copyright's growth 
been reasonable, or are its restrictions madness, and harmful to the development and 
distribution of art? This article explores the seven leading criticisms leveled against 
copyright's expansion, and examines one recent effort at legislative reform (the 
Orphan Works Act of 2006), and concludes that while improvements remain needed, 
the recent growth has been a measured and reasonable response to the divergent 
needs of the creators and users of works protected by copyright. 
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REASON OR MADNESS: A DEFENSE OF COPYRIGHT’S GROWING PAINS 
 MARC H. GREENBERG∗ 
PREFACE 
The inspiration for this article came from my attendance a few years ago at an 
American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”)1 panel of First Amendment scholars.  
The subject of the panel was the effect intellectual property law, and in particular, 
copyright law, had on free speech rights.  One of the panelists asserted the view that 
copyright law posed the greatest threat to First Amendment freedoms in this 
generation.  Although probably intentionally overstated, this provocative statement 
exemplified the passionate feelings of many in the academy.  
Over the last twenty years, a debate has been growing between scholars and 
practitioners over whether the duration and scope of U.S. copyright law has 
expanded, by case law and by statutory enactments, to the point where it now limits, 
and even endangers, the First Amendment rights of creators of expressive works.2  In 
short, the question is whether any growth of copyright protection has been the result 
of reasoned analysis and a careful weighing of policy considerations, or has it been an 
exercise in madness—uncontrolled growth that has damaged the cultural 
environment and the creativity of artists and the public at large.  As Professors Paul 
Schwarz and William Michael Treanor have noted, among these scholars who seem 
to characterize this growth as madness are such leading lights in the intellectual 
property (“IP”) law universe as Yochai Benkler, Lawrence Lessig, and Robert 
Merges.3 
The duration argument has focused on the recent extension of copyright 
protection to the life of the author plus seventy years.4  Concerns have been 
                                                                                                                       
∗ Marc H. Greenberg is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Intellectual Property Law 
Program at Golden Gate University School of Law in San Francisco, California.  The author thanks 
the faculty and administration of Golden Gate University School of Law for its support of this 
scholarship, and in particular thanks his colleague, Assoc. Professor William Gallagher, for his 
patient review and insightful comments on this manuscript.  The author also thanks student 
research assistant Meredith Gittings, whose research efforts were invaluable to this project.  This 
article is dedicated to the memory of Sidney N. Greenberg. 
** Available at www.jmripl.com. 
1 See generally The Association of American Law Schools, http://www.aals.org (last visited 
October 26, 2007).  AALS is an organization made up of most, but not all, of the American law 
schools accredited by the American Bar Association (“ABA”).  Id.  
2 See generally L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795–96 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the 
First Amendment did not preclude liability for infringement of copyrights and rejecting Nimmer’s 
contention that the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine may not adequately protect 
First Amendment interests as being not applicable in the case sub judice); Suntrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing how the Copyright Clause 
and the First Amendment were drafted to work together to prevent censorship); 1 HOWARD B. 
ABRAMS, LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:24 (2007). 
3 Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term 
Extension and Intellectual Property As Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2332 (2003). 
4 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. 1, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) 
[hereinafter CTEA] (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006)). 
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expressed that this term extension exceeds the “reasonable time” grant found in 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.5  Critics argue that many creative works are 
now protected beyond their useful life and that but for the statutory grant, would be 
otherwise available to third parties to reprint in online and other archival versions.6  
These “orphan copyrights” are not available, the critics argue, because the statutory 
grant interferes with other uses of the works.7 
A similar criticism is leveled against the derivative rights protection afforded to 
copyright holders.8  Some artists argue that granting creators the right to prevent 
others from using the first work as a basis for creating a new work is antithetical to 
the creative process.  
I take a contrary view.  I support the position of the Copyright Office and a 
minority of scholars to the effect that the copyright law does provide adequate 
safeguards, through such provisions as the Fair Use Law,9 to balance the rights of 
first creators against the rights of those that follow them.10  Following a brief 
introduction, Section One of this article will analyze the merits of seven of the 
leading arguments against existing copyright law.  These arguments are derived 
from the writings of Professors Yochai Benkler, Jed Rubenfield, C. Edwin Baker, and 
Neil Weinstock Netanel, which cogently and in great detail outline the basis for their 
views.   
Section Two analyzes and critiques the currently pending effort of the Copyright 
Office and Congress to offer a moderate answer to the Orphan Copyright issue, in the 
form of the “Orphan Works Act of 2006,” and suggests that this legislation, together 
with other moderate proposals to address concerns created by the scope of derivative 
works, may provide a framework for improving copyright law, without taking some of 
the more drastic reformative steps proposed by its principal critics. 
Noted American satirist Ambrose Bierce defined “Justice” in his brilliant book, 
The Devil’s Dictionary, thusly:  “A commodity which in a more or less adulterated 
condition the State sells to the citizen as a reward for his allegiance, taxes and 
personal service.”11  In this short essay I hope to demonstrate the copyright law, with 
only some minor alterations, can continue to provide even Bierce’s jaded citizens with 
their fair share of justice. 
                                                                                                                       
5 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating “[t]he 
economic effect of this 20-year extension—the longest blanket extension since the Nation's 
founding—is to make the copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual”). 
6 Id. at 249–54. 
7 Id. at 247–52. 
8 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting derivative rights protection to copyright holders). 
9 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
10 See, e.g., Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 3, at 2409; Kevin D. Galbraith, Note, Forever On 
the Installment Plan? An Examination of the Constitutional History of the Copyright Clause and 
Whether the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 Squares with the Founders’ Intent, 12 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1119, 1146–48 (2002);  Julia D. Mahoney, Book Review, 
Lawrence Lessig’s Dystopian Vision, 90 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2322–23 (2004). 
11 AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY (1911), reprinted in AMBROSE BIERCE, THE 
DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: AN AMBROSE BIERCE READER 279 (Brian St. Pierre ed., Chronicle Books 1987). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Professors Schwarz and Treanor refer to the champions of the attack on 
copyright as “IP Restrictors.”12  This characterization, while probably accurate, 
seems a bit incendiary, and likely drew objections as being overly pejorative.  For 
purposes of this article, I opt for the more restricted and less inflammatory 
characterization of their view as “Copyright Critics.” 
                                                                                                                      
The Critics present an array of arguments in support of their viewpoint.  In 
Section One of this article, I examine what I consider to be the primary seven 
arguments, which are as follows: 
a. Argument One: The expansion of copyright protection has been driven by 
media conglomerates, who have received from the legislature an allocation of 
entitlements, to the significant detriment of individuals and the public at large. 
b. Argument Two: Copyright’s principal purpose is to provide economic benefits 
to owners—this property right should not trump the First Amendment rights of 
users. 
c. Argument Three: Changes in the scope and term of copyright law since the 
1970 Nimmer article, as well as the nature of digital technology and the greater ease 
achieved in copying content, render Nimmer’s immunity doctrine out of date and in 
need of change. 
d. Argument Four: Since copyright deals with content, the law should be subject 
to a strict scrutiny analysis as to its impact on First Amendment rights, and under 
such scrutiny, it clearly violates the First Amendment rights of users. 
e. Argument Five: Some form of compulsory licensing for all copyrighted works 
should be sufficient to address the concerns of owners, which after all are principally 
economic in nature. 
f. Argument Six: Free speech rights include the right to use the words or other 
expression of another in expressing your own point of view. 
g. Argument Seven: The idea/expression doctrine and the fair use doctrine have 
become too rife with uncertainty to afford meaningful protection to users. 
I.  CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SEVEN ARGUMENTS 
A. Argument One:  The Expansion of Copyright Protection Has Been Driven by 
Media Conglomerates, Who Have Received from the Legislature an Allocation of 
Entitlements, to the Significant Detriment of Individuals and the Public at Large. 
There are two key arguments presented within this first category.  The first 
argument is that although copyright law, prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, both in 
duration and in scope, reflected a fair balance between the rights of authors to levels 
of protection for their original works which would serve as an incentive for them to 
continue their creative efforts, that balance has been irrevocably altered to the 
detriment of individual artists and the public by the expansion of copyright 
protections—an expansion fueled by the desire of media conglomerates to extend 
 
12 Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 3, at 2322. 
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their control over creative expression.  The second argument is that the amazing ease 
afforded by digital media to manipulate and distribute creative works gives rise to a 
whole new paradigm of use by third parties of copyrighted works, a range of use that 
should be allowed, and not hindered by the media conglomerate owners of copyright 
protected works. 
The proponents of this view are many, and their arguments can be found in a 
variety of books and articles.  For purposes of this article, three law review articles 
provided the principal source of these arguments: Jed Rubenfield, The Freedom of 
Imagination:  Copyright’s Constitutionality;13 C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment 
Limits on Copyright;14 and Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the 
First Amendment.15  While there are many other articles and authors to choose from 
as presenters of the Critics’ arguments, these three articles well exemplify these 
arguments and the grounds in support of them.  
Turning to the first argument, it is necessary to briefly summarize several key 
elements of copyright law which changed with the passage of the Copyright Act of 
1976.16  By making changes to the formalities needed to obtain and retain copyright, 
Congress moved away from an “opt-in” system of copyright protection, to an “opt-out” 
system.  This is a fundamental change in approach.   
Prior to 1976, the term of copyright protection had been an initial period of 
twenty-eight years, with a right, subject to compliance with a series of formalities, to 
renew protection for another twenty-eight years.17  The initial right to the first 
twenty-eight years required an owner or creator to go through a formal registration 
process.18  After the maximum protection period of fifty-six years, accomplished 
through registration of the copyright for both of the allowable terms, the work went 
into the public domain, divesting the owner of the copyright of all rights to the use of 
the work thereafter.19  Another significant obligation of the copyright owner was to 
conspicuously place notice of their claim of copyright, through the use of the 
international symbol ©, on all copies of the work.20  In short, creators or owners who 
desired to avail themselves of the benefits of copyright protection had to opt-in to the 
system by compliance with these formalities.  Failure to register, or renew, or display 
the required notice, resulted in a dedication of the work to the public domain.21 
By 1976, Congress felt that this opt-in system had generated problems for a 
sizeable number of persons who, by failure to comply with these formalities, lost the 
                                                                                                                       
13 Jed Rubenfield, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 
(2002).  Professor Rubenfield draws support for his views from Professor Benkler, particularly his 
article, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public 
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999). 
14 C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002). 
15 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
1 (2001).        
16 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) [hereinafter Copyright Act of 
1976]. 
17 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.01 (2004). 
18 2 id. § 7.01. 
19 1 id. § 2.03(G). 
20 2 id. § 7.01(A). 
21 2 id. § 7.01(A); 1 id. § 2.03(G). 
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protection of copyright law for their works.22  In a document published in the Federal 
Register in January 2005, Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, explained 
Congress’s reasoning as follows: 
Of course, it also meant that some copyrights were unintentionally allowed 
to enter the public domain, for instances, where the claimant was unaware 
that renewal had to occur within the one year window at the end of the first 
term or that the copyright was up for renewal.  The legislative history to the 
1976 Act reflects Congress’ recognition of the concern raised by some that 
eliminating renewal requirements would take a large number of works out 
of the public domain and that for a number of those older works it might be 
difficult or impossible to identify the copyright owner in order to obtain 
permissions.  Congress nevertheless determined that the renewal 
mechanism should be discarded, in part, because of the “inadvertent and 
unjust loss of copyright” it in some cases caused.23 
The 1976 Act transformed U.S. copyright law to an opt-out system.24  Once a 
work was fixed in a tangible form, it was automatically vested in the statutory 
protection scheme.25  The renewal requirement was abandoned, in favor of a single, 
much longer registration term of the life of the author plus fifty years.26  The 
requirement of formal notice was also eliminated.27  Creators still had to go through 
a formal registration process in order to avail themselves of the right to initiate an 
infringement lawsuit in federal court, and posting a formal © notice was a helpful 
way to create a presumption that any unauthorized use was intentional (opening the 
door to higher damage recovery), but on balance the shift to an opt-out system made 
obtaining protection much easier.28 
These changes were not, as Register Peters notes, universally lauded.29  The 
Copyright Critics felt that these changes created tremendous challenges for many 
individuals outside of the mainstream news and entertainment industries, and 
constituted a threat to those people’s free speech rights.30 
                                                                                                                       
22 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 134 (1976) (stating that the formalities of the renewal process 
were “the cause of inadvertent and unjust loss of copyright”). 
23 Marybeth Peters, Notice of Inquiry re: Orphan Works, Copyright Office, Library of Congress, 
70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3740 (Jan. 26, 2005) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 134), reprinted in 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW SECTION, STATE BAR OF CAL., THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE COMES TO 
CALIFORNIA (2005). 
24 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487–88, 557 
(2004); Pamela Brannon, Note, Reforming Copyright to Foster Innovation: Providing Access to 
Orphaned Works, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 158 (2006) (stating “[t]he 1976 Copyright Act 
discarded most of these formalities, shifting to an ‘opt-out’ system that granted copyright protection 
upon the initial creation and fixation of a work”). 
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); Sprigman, supra note 24, at  487–88. 
26 See Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 16.  In 1998, the fifty-year duration was extended to 
seventy years.  See CTEA, supra note 4. 
27 See Sprigman, supra note 24, at 487–88. 
28 Peters, supra note 23, at 3740.  As Ms. Peters notes: “The Copyright Act of 1976 made it 
substantially easier for an author to obtain and maintain copyright in his or her creative works.”  Id. 
29 Id. 
30 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244, 266 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Schwartz 
& Treanor, supra note 3, at 2337–40. 
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The claim of media conglomerate influence over the expansion of copyright is a 
key theme in Professor Baker’s article.31  He asserts that copyright’s increased scope, 
from the original ban on direct copying, to the much broader scope encompassed by 
derivative works, and the bar, subject to First Amendment and fair use exceptions, 
on noncommercial speech, has been driven by corporate enterprises, and is 
detrimental to the rights of individuals, who lack the political clout to influence 
Congress.32  He presents this view as follows: 
An institutional argument has possible relevance here.  Increases in 
the scope of copyright protection will predictably most advantage 
centralized, conglomerate media enterprises and their communications, 
while most likely disadvantaging nonmarket-oriented participants in the 
communication order. 
. . . The country has experienced a continual historical process of a 
copyright extension to encompass an increasing enclosure of the public 
domain of expressive content.  This history arguably illustrates the public’s 
weakness and the commercial media and publishing industry’s strength in 
the legislative arena, at least in the copyright context.33 
No empirical evidence is offered to support this view, and anecdotal evidence 
suggests a very different picture.  In fact, it is the individual artist who has gained 
substantially by the increased scope of copyright protection.  The derivative works 
right is what allowed photographer Art Rogers to stop Jeffrey Koons from 
appropriating his photo and reproducing it to great economic advantage.34  It is what 
allows new screenwriters protection against the appropriation of their scripts in the 
Hollywood industry.  It is what has allowed lesser known musicians the power to sue 
famous musicians for appropriation of their works.35 
                                                                                                                       
31 See Baker, supra note 14. 
32 Id. at 948–50. 
33 Id. at 948–49. 
34 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F. 2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).  Rogers created a compelling photographic 
image, entitled “Puppies,” of a smiling husband and wife holding a litter of eight beautiful German 
Shepherd puppies.  Id. at 304.  The image was used and exhibited many times, and was reprinted on 
posters and post cards.  Id.  New York sculptor and art entrepreneur Jeffrey Koons gave artisans 
working for him on an upcoming show a copy of Rogers’ puppies photo and told them to use it as a 
base for the creation of a three-dimensional sculpture.  Id. at 305.  He explained at trial his view 
that the work simply represented an aspect of mass culture, and as such, he was free to use it as a 
basis for his new work.  Id. at 305.  His team made four copies of the sculptural version, entitled 
“String of Puppies,” and three copies were sold for a total of $367,000.  Id.  Rogers, the decidedly less 
well-known of the two men, brought suit against Koons for copyright infringement.  Id.  The district 
court found that Rogers had a protectable copyright in the photographic image, and that Koons had 
clearly copied it and created a derivative work in a different media without authorization, making 
him liable for copyright infringement.  Id. at 306.  The court of appeals affirmed.  Id. at 314. 
35 See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976).  The 50’s era band The Chiffons brought suit against George Harrison on the grounds that his 
song, My Sweet Lord, was an unauthorized derivative work based on their song, He’s So Fine.  Id. at 
178.  The court found for the plaintiffs based on the substantial similarity between the works.  Id. at 
181.  Again, this is a case of a less well known artist successfully prosecuting a copyright 
infringement case against a much more successful and wealthy defendant. 
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In another assertion frequently made by the Copyright Critics, Baker asserts: 
“Increases in the scope of copyright protection will predictably most advantage 
centralized, conglomerate media enterprises and their communications, while most 
likely disadvantaging non-market-oriented participants in the communication 
order.”36  And once again, Baker offers no empirical support for this conclusion.   
Earlier on, he summarizes the policy argument he is making thusly: “In any 
event, the premise of this Essay is that copyright can legitimately protect a market in 
the copyrighted work only to the extent that the protection does not infringe upon 
First Amendment rights.”37  This, in essence, rejects any balancing policy approach 
in favor of the absolute primacy of the First Amendment over the property rights of 
copyright holders. 
Critic Netanel makes a similar argument, echoing Stanford Professor Larry 
Lessig, in asserting: “Over the past three decades, copyright industries have become 
increasingly concentrated as book, newspaper and magazine publishers, film and 
recording studios, television broadcasters, cable television operators, manufacturers 
of consumer electronics, software manufacturers, telecommunications companies, 
and Internet service providers have merged into entertainment conglomerates.”38  
While this may be somewhat true for the United States, there is very little 
evidence that it is true for Africa, Asia or Europe.  Further, the depth of media 
activity is far greater than the product generated by the conglomerates.  There are 
hundreds of thousands of small companies in the entertainment and media 
businesses throughout the United States, and many thousands of writers, artists, 
performers, and inventors throughout the country.  The digital age has increased, not 
decreased, the opportunities available to creators to generate artistic expression—
and Professor Netanel offers no empirical evidence to suggest that their creative 
expression rights have been significantly impaired by the mergers at the top end of 
the industries.  On the contrary, it is my thesis that the added protections embodied 
in a longer copyright term, the removal of the notice requirement, and the right to 
control derivative works provides greater protection for the “little guy” creator from 
the allegedly avaricious practices of the media conglomerates. 
In another popular argument offered by the Copyright Critics, Professor Netanel 
asserts, again without any significant empirical evidence to support it, that the 
government, through the copyright law as presently constituted and interpreted by 
the judiciary, is actively participating in a preferential distribution of “speech 
entitlements” to media conglomerates—presumably to the detriment of individuals.39  
The argument is presented thusly: “The allocation of speech entitlements to 
politically powerful industries leads to a suspicion that the government is improperly 
distributing rent to the detriment of the First Amendment interests of other speakers 
and the public at large.”40  Absent any evidence of how this allocation of 
entitlements, if indeed that is what has happened, has had the result of suppressing 
                                                                                                                       
36 Baker, supra note 14, at 948 (citing Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 357 & n.14 
(1999)). 
37 Id. at 919 n.70. 
38 Netanel, supra note 15, at 27. 
39 Id. at 60–67. 
40 Id. at 66. 
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speech, or the creative impulses, of other speakers and the public, it is hard to give 
this argument much credence. 
                                                                                                                      
On the contrary, Professor Julia Mahoney has noted that even in Lawrence 
Lessig’s dark view of the future, his third book on the impact of the digital revolution, 
Free Culture:  How Big Media Uses Technology,41 the author has had to acknowledge 
that the explosion of the Internet “has resulted in a constant stream of news and 
commentary—a great deal of it generated by individuals unbeholden to major media 
entities—with the happy result that thoughtful public discourse on substantive 
issues flourishes.”42  Consistent with the view that copyrights’ benefits are only 
available to the wealthy, Professor Lessig asserts that the legal system “doesn’t work 
for anyone except those with the most resources . . . .”43  While it has always been 
true that wealth and power provide greater access to legal resources, it is also true 
that a number of resources are also available to those of little means to obtain legal 
representation.44  
This is also the place to insert an additional factor in the analysis of the merit of 
the Critics’ viewpoint.  This factor is the effect the changes proposed by the Critics 
would have on how the global marketplace would view U.S. IP law protection.  It is 
interesting to note that the Critics rarely discuss in any detail the impact their 
proposals would have on that global marketplace.  It was, however, a significant 
consideration of the Supreme Court in the Eldred v. Ashcroft45 decision.  The Court 
noted: 
[A] key factor in the CTEA’s passage was a 1993 European Union (EU) 
directive instructing EU members to establish a baseline copyright term of 
life plus 70 years. . . . and to deny this longer term to the works of any non-
EU country whose laws did not secure the same extended term.  By 
extending the baseline United States copyright term to life plus 70 years, 
Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same 
copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts.46 
 
41 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY (Penguin Press 
2004) [hereinafter FREE CULTURE]. 
42 Mahoney, supra note 10, at 2308.  
43 FREE CULTURE, supra note 41, at 305. 
44 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Mitchell Estate Settles ‘Gone With the Wind’ Suit, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 10, 2002, at C6.  Such organizations as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, California Lawyers 
for the Arts (which has related branches in New York, Illinois and other states), the Comic Book 
Legal Defense Fund, and local bar association legal referral services, all function to provide access to 
the public at large for IP cases.  The recent successful battle fought by the author of The Wind Done 
Gone, by a relatively unknown author, is further evidence that access to the legal system by 
individual creators is perhaps not as limited as Professor Lessig asserts.   
45 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  Professor Lessig, in this case, represented Plaintiff Eric Eldred in a 
challenge to the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”), through which 
Congress had extended the term of Copyright under U.S. law from the life of the author plus fifty 
years, to the life of the author plus seventy years.  Id. at 192–93.  The majority of the Court found 
that CTEA did not violate the constitutional limitation in Article I, Section 8 that copyrights endure 
only for “limited times,” and that the CTEA did not violate Eldred’s First Amendment rights.  Id. at 
194. 
46 Id. at 205–06 (citations omitted). 
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It is particularly instructive, and perhaps representative of a geocentric 
perspective we can no longer afford in an era of globalization of intellectual property 
law, that none of the Critics arguments in favor of a rollback of the scope and 
duration of U.S. copyright law ever address the effect such a legislative change would 
have on our interaction in that marketplace.  The majority in Eldred understood that 
Congress, and the courts, should share that concern given the now international 
nature of intellectual property. 
The other significant consideration is that the proposals made by the Critics to 
eliminate derivative works protection on the grounds that it too is unconstitutional 
will, just like the term issue, put us on a collision course with the rest of the world on 
copyright issues. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which establishes the 
principal that droit morale (moral rights) provides a right of artists to protect the 
integrity of their works.47  A rollback of derivative rights, and a limitation of 
copyright infringement actions solely to those cases that involved direct copying, a 
position advocated by the Critics, is inconsistent with the position of the rest of the 
world, that artists are entitled to protect not only against direct copying of their 
work, but also against derivative usages that adversely affect the integrity of the 
work.   
Copyright is not, and never has been, a uniquely American doctrine.  A side 
effect of the digital revolution is that we now are closer to what Marshall McLuhan 
meant when he talked of the global village in Understanding Media,48 and IP issues 
cannot be limited in discussion solely to their impact in the United States—it is a 
global market that now must be considered.  We cannot protect and exploit our 
intellectual property in a geographic vacuum.  The world market demands some 
degree of harmonization (witness the adroit maneuvering in the world intellectual 
property arena which allowed the United States to sign the Berne convention, 
without ever formally adopting the full range of moral rights granted under Article 
6bis).  The limitations proposed to the scope of copyright protection by the Critics, 
without considering the impact those changes would make in a world we no longer 
dominate in intellectual property is both naïve, and in this era of doubt about the 
United States’ willingness to be true partners with the rest of the world’s 
democracies, may even be a bit dangerous. 
In sum, the lack of empirical evidence that the benefits of the expansion of 
copyright protection over the history of U.S. copyright law have inured only to the 
wealthy and the powerful, contrasted with the determination by the Copyright Office, 
Congress and the courts, that the expanded elements serve to protect all copyright 
owners and to further encourage the creative process, is indicative of the lack of 
merit of this first argument. 
 
                                                                                                                       
47 Paris Act relating to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
art. 6bis, July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
48 MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (MIT Press 1964). 
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B.  Argument Two:  Copyright’s Principal Purpose Is To Provide Economic  
Benefits to Owners—The Property Right Created by Copyright Law Should  
Not Trump the First Amendment Rights of Users. 
This argument begins with the assumption that the principal purpose and 
incentive offered to creators under copyright law is the economic benefits that flow 
from copyright ownership.  To the extent these benefits are akin to a property right 
conferred on the owners, the next element of the argument asserts that such a 
property right lacks a sufficient constitutional basis to be deemed superior, and/or 
immune to First Amendment concerns. 
Professor Netanel presents this aspect of the Critic’s argument by positing that 
even if the argument made that copyright is a form of property interest is true, this 
status should not be a basis for immunity from First Amendment scrutiny.49  In 
support of this view, he notes that trademark, right of publicity, and trade secret 
issues have been subjected to First Amendment scrutiny.50  The problem with these 
supporting examples is that, unlike copyright, none of them draw their basis from a 
constitutional grant, nor do any of these examples have the same qualities of 
copyright protected works—they cannot be endlessly duplicated for profit, the 
protections they offer are not limited by any time period, and the value they contain 
does not derive from their creative expression.  In short, as examples, these are 
inapposite to the argument advanced. 
Professor Baker also asserts that copyright’s purpose is principally economic in 
nature, and that this is the primary incentive built into the copyright law, in the 
form of the limited monopoly.51  He demonstrates his acceptance of this view when he 
writes: “While copyright protects the authors’ financial interests in their works,”52 
and again when he asserts that “the ultimate concern of copyright is also the content-
based desire to promote the creation and distribution of presumably quality or 
‘desired’ content rather than merely amateur communications that people would 
generate without an expectation of the economic rewards of ownership.”53 
The weakness in this argument is that as copyright law has evolved over the 
past one hundred plus years, its purpose and the benefits it confers have changed.  
There can be no question that the first copyright laws in the European tradition, 
such as Britain’s Statute of Anne,54 had as their principal concern the economic well-
being of book publishers.  In fact, these early copyright laws gave little protection to 
authors, and in an interesting irony, were then more interested in the economic well-
being of the media conglomerate of their day—prominent book publishers. However, 
this has changed over the history of copyright, and the law now also serves, in the 
United States, as the creative persons’ equivalent of droit morale.  Albeit limited by 
the application of the First Amendment and by the fair use doctrine, copyright now 
serves far more than an economic purpose—it is also the means by which artists can 
maintain some degree of artistic integrity in their works.  This is the purpose 
Congress and the courts have been protecting since 1870, and I submit that 
                                                                                                                       
49 Netanel, supra note 15, at 39. 
50 Id. 
51 Baker, supra note 14, at 925, 926. 
52 Id. at 925. 
53 Id. at 926. 
54 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
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encouraging us to sacrifice that integrity runs directly counter to the imperative of 
Article I, Section 8’s charge that we seek to enhance and protect the creative process. 
On the subject of unpublished materials of newsworthy value, Professor Baker 
appears to not understand the marketplace for IP product.  He suggests that the 
press has an absolute right, superior to the author’s control of when a work is to be 
released, to publish it in satisfaction of the public’s need to know: “However, any 
purported right of an author to determine when, and especially, whether to publish 
interferes directly with the press’ role of providing information.  Such a right should 
be rejected on First Amendment grounds.”55  Taken to its logical conclusion, this 
suggests that authors’ first drafts, or incomplete paintings, or other artistic creations, 
are fair game for early publication in satisfaction of the role of the press.  It does not 
matter if the work is unfinished, or the artist feels it is a work not yet ready for 
publication, or if the artist is contractually bound to secrecy—if the press can get a 
hold of it, there should be no restraint on its publication.  This is actually worse than 
the economic argument, supra, since it disregards contractual responsibilities in 
favor of the “freedom” of the press. 
To illustrate that the scope of U.S. copyright law provides benefits beyond purely 
economic ones, examples can easily be found in literary and theatrical circles.  In a 
recent issue of The New Yorker magazine, writer D.T. Max profiled Stephen Joyce, 
the sole surviving relative (grandson) of the writer James Joyce.56  Stephen Joyce has 
made a number of Joyce scholars angry over the years because he has taken a very 
strong stance in defending what he perceives to be his grandfather’s legacy, and in 
the process has denied access or license to many scholars and writers seeking to 
write about James Joyce.57  Efforts to stage public readings from Ulysses, or to 
publish newly edited versions of the work have been met by lawsuit filings initiated 
by Stephen Joyce.58 
Mr. Max notes that Stephen Joyce is not the first or the only executor of a 
literary estate to resist the agenda of scholars.59  Examples include T.S. Eliot’s 
widow, who has opposed all biographies of her husband, and has withheld 
publication of the balance of his letters.60  Ted Hughes destroyed Sylvia Plath’s 
journal of their last months together, and the Samuel Beckett estate sues theatre 
companies that mount unorthodox versions of his plays.61  The Gershwin estate is 
notorious for the extent it exerts control over the use of Gershwin’s works.62   
Yet in all of these examples, it has never been suggested that the principal 
purpose these heirs are seeking to protect is an economic one.  In fact, a broader 
discussion and dissemination of the works of these artists might indeed enhance the 
bank account of their heirs.  However, something more is at stake here.  The goals of 
these heirs are to preserve the legacy of the artist, the quality of their work, and the 
                                                                                                                       
55 Baker, supra note 14, at 943. 
56 D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector, THE NEW YORKER, June 19, 2006, at 34–43. 
57 Id. at 35. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 36–37. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy & Bess 
and Unfair Use (bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 1116, 2006), available at http://law. 
bepress.com/expresso/eps/1116 (providing an excellent discussion of the Gershwin Estate’s conduct). 
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integrity inherent in its original form.  The much discussed action of Ted Turner in 
colorizing a collection of classic films, and the efforts of other directors to resist 
colorizing of their classic films, is yet another example of this point.63   
While there is certainly room for criticism of the manner in which some artists, 
or their heirs, attempt to protect their legacy, what is without argument is the fact 
that all of these artists and heirs recognize that their copyrights have value beyond 
pure economics.  The right to say no to a prospective use which violates the integrity 
of the artist—long present in the European Union and other signatory states to the 
Berne Convention, is provided to creators and speakers in this country via the 
Copyright Act.  As such, it involves more than merely an economic basis, and as such 
is much more than a mere property right.  For that reason, the argument that as a 
mere property right it cannot be entitled to immunity from First Amendment 
scrutiny fails. 
C.  Argument Three:  Changes in the Scope and Term of Copyright Law Since  
the 1970 Nimmer Article, as well as the Nature of Digital Technology and  
the Greater Ease Achieved in Copying Content, Render Nimmer’s Immunity  
Doctrine Out of Date and in Need of Change. 
Professor Netanel begins his article by acknowledging that the seminal written 
work on First Amendment/copyright issues is Melville Nimmer’s 1970 article, Does 
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?64  He 
asserts that while Nimmer’s viewpoint, which has been widely interpreted to support 
the notion that copyright is immune from First Amendment scrutiny, “might have 
been plausible in 1970,”65 evolving First Amendment scholarship, the expanded scope 
of copyright following the 1976 amendments and the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA”), and the digital explosion of the last twenty years, makes the view that 
copyright is immune from First Amendment scrutiny a “striking anomaly.”66 
Professor Netanel acknowledges also that Nimmer pointed out that First 
Amendment considerations were balanced by copyright’s limiting factors—the 
idea/expression dichotomy and its limited term (and the doctrine of fair use).67  While 
acknowledging that copyright does, to a degree, limit speech, Nimmer felt these 
limitations were “justified by the greater public good in the copyright encouragement 
of creative works.”68 
Professor Netanel argues, however, that times have changed.69  Copyright’s 
scope has been expanded by the 1976 Act and the DMCA, and its term has been 
expanded by the Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) to life plus seventy, 
                                                                                                                       
63 See, e.g., Jack Mathews, Film Directors See Red Over Ted Turner’s Movie Tinting, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1986, § 6, at 1. 
64 Netanel, supra note 15, at 4 (discussing Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the 
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186–1204 (1970) 
[hereinafter Nimmer 1970 article]).   
65 Id. at 4. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 8 (citing Nimmer 1970 article, supra note 64, at 1193–1200). 
68 Id. (quoting Nimmer 1970 article, supra note 64, at 1192). 
69 Id. at 12. 
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whereas in 1970 it was still the opt-in system of twenty-eight years, with one renewal 
right for another twenty-eight years for a total of fifty-six years of protection.70  
Considering these changes, Professor Netanel asserts: “Today, copyright law’s 
primary internal safety valves—the idea/expression dichotomy, fair use privilege, 
and limited term—provide far weaker constraints on copyright holder prerogatives 
that they did in 1970.”71  Tellingly, what is missing here, as is generally the case in 
all of the Critics’ arguments, is any significant empirical evidence to support this 
gloomy assessment. 
There is also an interesting temporal note here.  Professor Baker is also critical 
of these earlier writings, noting that earlier commentators, such as Nimmer and Paul 
Goldstein, advocated more of an accommodation approach, seeking a balance 
between the First Amendment and copyright.72  He summarized their approach, and 
his differing view, thusly: 
The classic commentators on the First Amendment and copyright found a 
presumptive conflict between the two constitutional provisions and then 
proceeded to recommend resolution by a policy informed balancing.  At least 
initially I want to resist that balancing approach. . . . 
. . . An unwavering commitment to the First Amendment requires that 
the first question be: What scope does a strict interpretation of the First 
Amendment leave for copyright grants?  Only if the answer is that his 
interpretation really leaves too little scope to be acceptable should a 
commentator proceed to advocate accommodations or balancing.73 
It primarily appears to be within the last fifteen to twenty years that the 
accommodation and balancing view of the classic copyright scholars has come under 
attack.  Given that these attacks paralleled the growth of the Internet, this fact 
suggests that much of the criticism of copyright is fueled by the ease of copying and 
distribution triggered by digital technology—and the desire to exploit that ease by 
loosening the restrictions of copyright law.  However, as Senator Orrin Hatch pointed 
out in the Napster debates on Congress, in an atmosphere of claims that all art 
should be freely distributed online: How do we guarantee compensation for artists?74 
Mahoney points out that Professor Lessig makes a similar argument in Free 
Culture.75  However, she notes that even he has to admit that “[t]he Internet 
provided a public forum where people came together to share their reactions to 
                                                                                                                       
70 See Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 16; CTEA, supra note 4; 3 NIMMER, supra note 17, 
§ 9.01; 2 NIMMER, supra note 18, § 7.01. 
71 Netanel, supra note 15, at 12. 
72 Baker, supra note 14, at 894 n.8. 
73 Id. at 894–95 (citations omitted). 
74 See Thomas C. Greene, Senator Hatch’s Napster Epiphany, REG., Oct. 23, 2000, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/10/23/senator_hatchs_napster_epiphany (discussing Sen. Hatch’s 
difficulty reconciling his admiration for Napster with the rights of copyright owners under the 
DMCA). 
75 Mahoney, supra note 10, at 2308. 
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events such as the September 11, 2001 tragedy, and the Internet continues to serve 
as a virtual town square as well as a source of information for millions.”76 
Mahoney also deflates a claim by Professor Lessig that instances like the 
Napster77 and Grokster78 decisions, which restricted the freedom of peer-to-peer 
(“p2p”) file sharing based on copyright infringement, are a further sign of damage to 
cultural and expressive freedom.79  She cogently points out that: 
It is important to bear in mind that the vast majority of those who avail 
themselves of p2p technology are consumers in search of music and other 
forms of entertainment, not creators in search of inspiration.  For the 
government to regulate the means and manner by which consumers obtain 
goods is unexceptional, particularly when a key goal of the regulation is to 
protect the value of property.80 
Further, Mahoney notes the argument that there has been a significant 
expansion in derivative rights is unsupported by empirical data.81  The fact is that 
derivative rights have been a part of copyright doctrine for over 100 years, with no 
significant evidence of their serving as an impediment to the development of creative 
expression.  On the contrary, as I have argued elsewhere, it is the existence of the bar 
against abuse of a creator’s derivative rights that keeps the media conglomerates 
from brutally exploiting the works of individual creators. 
Underlying this argument is the claim that the expansion of copyright has 
caused, and will cause in the future, a significant loss of creative and imaginative 
freedom for the people of the United States.  What is missing in any of the arguments 
presented in support of this claim is any empirical evidence that this dire forecast 
has, to any significant degree, come true or is likely to come true.  Aside from the 
evidence that Orphan Copyright is an issue that, in the digital age, has greater 
significance and needs to be addressed,82 the record is devoid of evidence in support 
of this argument.  
D.  Argument Four:  Since Copyright Deals with Content, the Law Should Be  
Subject to a Strict Scrutiny Analysis as to Its Impact on First Amendment Rights, 
and Under Such Scrutiny, It Clearly Violates the First Amendment Rights of Users. 
The strength, and weakness, of this argument lies in the definition of the term 
“content” in the Free Speech context, in the context of judicial interpretations of the 
First Amendment, and in the copyright context.  I submit that content in the free 
speech context refers both to the ideas a speaker presents, and the language or other 
                                                                                                                       
76 Id. at 2321 (citing FREE CULTURE, supra note 41, at 40–41). 
77 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
78 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  
79 Mahoney, supra note 10, at 2324.   
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 2331. 
82 See infra Section Two for a discussion and critique of the Copyright Office’s Report on 
Orphan Works (2006), and of the Orphan Works Act of 2006 for a summary of the first legislative 
response to the orphan works problem. 
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expressive means used to present that idea.  For courts applying the term “content” 
in a strict scrutiny context seeking to determine if a statute violates the First 
Amendment by banning certain works, the term “content” is focused on the ideas 
expressed, and not on the means of expression used.83  Finally, copyright, in 
particular infringement cases, focuses purely on the means of expression used, since 
the statute expressly precludes protection for ideas.84 
The Critics seek to use the free speech definition as a basis for challenging 
copyright—arguing under this definition that since copyright clearly “deals” with 
content, it is a content-based law which requires strict scrutiny and a bias in favor of 
finding that it violates First Amendment protections.  The problem with this 
approach is that content, when subject to any copyright law analysis, only pertains to 
expression, and therefore the claim that for constitutional purposes it means more 
than that is erroneous.  
Professor Baker supports the Critics’ view by suggesting that under a strict 
scrutiny analysis, warranted because copyright deals with content, the market 
incentive concerns underlying copyright do not rise to the level of a compelling 
government concern, and proposes that perhaps those concerns can be addressed by 
less restrictive means.85  He writes: “If content must be examined to determine if a 
law is violated then the law is content based.”86  Does this mean that reporting a 
theft of art from your home, in which the police must have a description of the art, 
means that art theft is a content-based law?  Similarly, in a case of the theft of a rare 
book, a description of the book, the art on the cover, and its subject matter is 
required—does this make the theft law subject to a content-based strict scrutiny?  
Additional examples from art and music illustrate the problems with this approach.  
A copy of a musical piece focuses on the sequence of notes, not the underlying melody 
or musical concept embodied in the piece.  A derivative copy of a piece of artwork 
repeats elements of the composition, not the content, consisting of the concept of the 
piece.   
The question that should be asked is whether the restriction on content found in 
copyright law really abridges someone’s freedom of expression and whether there is a 
fair policy in saying that anyone is free, for example, to paint a portrait.  However, 
they are not free to take someone else’s property, their painting of a portrait, and use 
that for their own benefit.  Interestingly enough, what this argument does is turn one 
of copyright’s attributes, the ability to reuse the work via copies without diminishing 
it, against the creator.  There is no question that if I wanted to paint a portrait, and 
saw a similar portrait you did on your wall, that I cannot, in my expression of free 
speech, come into your house, take your painting, cut out the face in it, and put it in 
my painting.  But because art in the digital world can more easily be reproduced 
through mechanical means, suddenly it is a violation of your freedom of expression to 
take a copy of the work, which is sold with the express understanding that it may not 
be used by you, and use it for your own purposes, be they commercial or 
noncommercial. 
                                                                                                                       
83 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
84 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
85 Baker, supra note 14, at 922. 
86 Id. 
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Interestingly, Professor Netanel disagrees with some of the other Critics on this 
point.  He presents a cogent argument against those Critics who claim that copyright 
is content-based regulation.  He notes: 
Like the restrictions at issue in the above cases, traditional copyright 
law restricts the manner in which one can express an idea.  Because of 
copyright, I cannot use certain expressive formulations to convey my idea.  
But the government’s interest in enforcing copyright law is not to suppress 
a particular message, subject matter, or communicative impact.  Thus, 
although the question of whether a work infringes copyright turns on the 
work’s “content,” copyright law is not “content-based” for First Amendment 
purposes.87 
Having made this statement, Professor Netanel then asserts that while 
copyright does escape strict scrutiny because it is not content-based, it should instead 
of being immune, be subject to intermediate scrutiny, under the principles set forth 
in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.88  The three-part test supported by the 
Court in that case held that a regulation would withstand a constitutional challenge 
if it is: 1) justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, 2) 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 3) leaves open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.89  Professor 
Netanel, who will go on to apply this Turner test to copyright law in his article, does 
admit that in a subsequent litigation over the same “must carry” issues, known as 
Turner II,90 the Court backed away from this application, and took a stance more 
deferential to Congress’s position of granting copyright immunity from constitutional 
scrutiny.91  In the Eldred decision, the majority opinion also expressly considered, 
and rejected, reliance on Turner I, despite Professor Lessig’s argument that it applied 
in that case.92  The Court did not adopt the absolute immunity standard either, 
indicating instead that Mr. Eldred’s case did not require such scrutiny: 
Finally, the case petitioners principally rely upon for their First 
Amendment argument, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, bears 
little on copyright.  The statute at issue in Turner required cable operators 
to carry and transmit broadcast stations through their proprietary cable 
systems.  Those “must-carry” provisions, we explained, implicated “the 
heart of the First Amendment,” namely, “the principle that each person 
should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of 
expression, consideration and adherence.”93 
                                                                                                                       
87 Netanel, supra note 15, at 54. 
88 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (applying an intermediate scrutiny standard to a constitutional 
challenge of the FCC’s “must carry” rules); Netanel, supra note 15, at 54–55. 
89 Netanel, supra note 15, at 55 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)). 
90 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195–96 (1997). 
91 Netanel, supra note 15, at 58–59. 
92 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003). 
93 Id. (citations omitted). 
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The CTEA, in contrast, does not oblige anyone to reproduce another’s speech 
against the carrier’s will.94  Instead, it protects the author’s original expression from 
unrestricted exploitation.  Protection of that order does not raise the free speech 
concerns present when the government compels or burdens the communication of 
particular facts or ideas.  The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to 
make—or decline to make—one’s own speech, while it bears less heavily when 
speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.  To the extent such 
assertions raise First Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in free speech 
safeguards are generally adequate to address them.  We recognize that the D.C. 
Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights “categorically immune from 
challenges under the First Amendment.”95  But when, as in this case, Congress has 
not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment 
scrutiny is unnecessary.”96 
Despite the uncertainty of its application, Professor Netanel hypothesizes as to 
how the Turner intermediate scrutiny standard should be applied to several aspects 
of contemporary copyright law.97  He begins this analysis with a look at the CTEA, 
and argues that there was little need to extend copyright protection, noting that 
copyrights are likely to lose their value before the period expires: “Given the already 
lengthy copyright term in force prior to the amendment and the considerable 
uncertainty regarding whether a copyrighted work created today will yield any 
revenue in years hence, the present value of the CTEA’s twenty-year extension for 
new authors is negligible.”98 
The authorities cited in support of this argument appear to be out of date.  More 
importantly, the premise that copyrighted works created today will lack value in 
years hence is utterly without support.  Can we say with any degree of certainty that 
paintings by Hockney or other contemporary masters will lack value many years 
hence?  Or that operas written today will not be performed in 100 years?  Or that 
classic films (like the Lord of the Rings Trilogy) will not still be shown in 100 years, 
like Chaplin and other silent era classics are still being performed?  Or that the 
stories of Ray Bradbury, many of whom were published more than fifty-six years ago, 
will not be read for more than seventy years after his death? 
 In fact, Ray Bradbury provides a good example.  At eighty-six now, under the 
1909 act, all of his seminal works written before the age of thirty would now be in the 
public domain—and as to those works, his heirs would receive nothing.99  Why is it 
that the Copyright Critics fail to consider that the incentive provided to creators to 
create works includes the fact that under the present copyright term those works can 
be a legacy for their heirs and families?  We do not require the owners of property to 
escheat it to the state after fifty-six years—nor do we require any other business 
owner, or holder of a trade secret or trademark, to give up their valuable asset after 
fifty-six years—so what justifies carving out this exception for creators?  Professors 
Baker and Netanel do the arts a disservice by implying that they are of such a 
transitory and ephemeral nature.  
                                                                                                                       
94 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). 
95 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.   
96 Id. (citations omitted). 
97 Netanel, supra note 15, at 55–58. 
98 Id. at 70.   
99 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 9.01. 
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The decision in Eldred, making clear that in most, if not all instances, copyright 
is not content-based in the way that requires strict scrutiny, provides a solid 
analytical basis for the rejection of this argument. 
E.  Argument Five:  Some Form of Compulsory Licensing for All Copyrighted  
Works Should Be Sufficient To Address the Concerns of Owners, Which After  
All Are Principally Economic in Nature. 
An oft-suggested remedy deployed by the Critics for the appropriation of 
copyright protected works via creation of unauthorized derivative works is the idea 
that by creating a compulsory licensing scheme, creators will receive adequate 
compensation for the use, and prospective defendants will be free to use those works 
without fear of costly and time-consuming litigation.  While this idea has some 
surface appeal, it ultimately is a poor substitute for existing copyright protection, 
because it fails to account for the artist’s desire to preserve the integrity of their 
work, and their own reputation, by exercising their right to decline uses they deem 
inappropriate. 
Professor Baker presents this argument in the “Remedies” section of his article, 
wherein he suggests that rather than infringement damages, copyright owners 
should only be able to recover a “constitutionally mandated, judicially determined 
license fee.”100  So he would argue, presumably, that the conservative Christian 
groups who recently made headlines when they altered films and television shows to 
cut out material they felt was objectionable, and then sold their edited versions to 
their constituents,101 would be an acceptable adaptation of the original work, so long 
as they paid for the privilege.  Professor Baker suggests that any copyright owner 
who objects to a use of their work despite the offer of a reasonable fee must be 
motivated by reasons including “privacy, maintaining or gaining political power, and 
preserving possibly undeserved reputation.”102  He does not consider that sometimes 
owners of a deserved reputation may object to a misuse of their work—for example: 
Woody Allen would presumably object to the colorization of Manhattan, regardless of 
the amount of the fee offered to accomplish that transformation. 
A note of caution about compulsory licensing systems is also called for in 
response to the Critics’ suggestion that this is a worthy panacea.  Compulsory 
licensing systems have been roundly criticized in the music industry as fostering 
racially biased treatment of artists—notably black artists—with the most famous 
example being the wholesale appropriation of soul and rhythm and blues from black 
artists in the 1950’s, such as Chuck Berry and Little Richard, by white artists such 
as Pat Boone and the Beatles.103  The inexpensive compulsory license fees (currently 
a little over 6.5 cents per song) allow popular artists to “cover,” i.e., do their own 
version, of previously published songs with very little compensation being paid to the 
                                                                                                                       
100 Baker, supra note 14, at 947. 
101 Clean Flicks, LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D. Col. 2006) (ruling that the 
company CleanFlicks was infringing movie studios’ copyrights by editing and reselling the movies 
after “deleting ‘sex, nudity, profanity and gory violence,’ using its own guidelines”) (citation omitted). 
102 Baker, supra note 14, at 947. 
103 See K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture, and Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 20 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339 (1999) (discussing the music business and black artists). 
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songwriter.  Given these problems, and the droit morale issues presented by a 
compulsory license system based purely on a guaranteed fee that divests the owner of 
any control over their artistic integrity, this proposed solution is sorely deficient, and 
this argument deserves to be rejected. 
F.  Argument Six:  Free Speech Rights Include the Right To Use the Words or  
Other Expression of Another in Expressing Your Own Point of View. 
This argument goes to the heart of the conflict between free speech rights and 
the rights of copyright owners.  As the Supreme Court noted in the Eldred decision, 
free speech rights in original speech are strongly protected under the First 
Amendment, but when the speech involved belongs to another person, the protection 
afforded is greatly diminished, particularly if that third party speech is subject to 
copyright protection.104 
The Copyright Critics, however, staunchly defend the right to use others’ speech. 
Professor Baker presents this view as follows: 
Her choice to express herself by repeating or distributing someone else’s 
initially authored words (or to retain access to specific intellectual products) 
does not lessen the fact that her freedom is at stake. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Her peculiar choice of words, even her choice to speak through the 
words of another, can be the exercise of her expressive freedom.105 
What freedom?  The freedom to use another’s property for her own benefit?  How 
do we justify this use as valid—when another form of use—say borrowing clothes 
from your neighbor’s closet to make a personal statement—is deemed theft? 
Professor Netanel then makes the interesting and controversial statement that 
persons seeking to present a viewpoint should be allowed, without hinder, to use the 
words of another to present their views: “But even beyond short quotations, effective 
speech sometimes requires the verbatim copying of substantial portions of existing 
literary expression.”106  He offers six examples in support of this statement—none of 
which reflect that the author’s ability to communicate their central idea would have 
been impaired by copyright restrictions—and in many, if not most of the examples, 
the fair use doctrine might, if raised, have provided shelter for the users.107  
After citing these examples, Professor Netanel qualifies their benefit to his 
argument by acknowledging: “One cannot say that such copying was absolutely 
necessary for the speaker to make his or her point.”108  Instead, he argues that the 
speaker’s point “would have been far less effective, far less believable, and of far less 
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105 Baker, supra note 14, at 936–38. 
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value to the intended audience, without reproducing (or translating) verbatim 
substantial portions of the author’s work.”109  He offers no empirical evidence in 
support of this claim, which to some degree essentially argues that those who lack 
the ability to convey a view or position in their own words should be entitled, as a 
matter of law, to take the words of others, without attribution or compensation, and 
present them as their own—and that such a use is consistent with the Freedom of 
Expression principles embodied in the First Amendment. 
Mahoney summarizes Professor Lessig’s contribution to this argument thusly:  
“To Lessig, the key insight is that the freedom to make use of previous work without 
first obtaining permission plays an essential role in creativity and innovation.”110  
She counters that argument with this response: 
The fact that a shift in a particular property regime makes some 
projects harder to accomplish, however, is hardly proof of its 
deficiency. . . . [T]he fact that some projects are never undertaken or 
completed is not convincing evidence of actual or imminent cultural 
impoverishment, nor is it evidence that American culture is changing in 
some fundamental way.  
. . . This argument would carry greater weight if he could point to 
evidence of a decline—or even a slowed rate of growth—in such creativity or 
innovation. . . . His quest, however, to convince his readers that, absent 
radical reform, disaster awaits, is undermined by the stark reality that the 
United States is awash in intellectual outputs.111 
So where we come out at the end of this analysis is a policy choice. This 
argument really isn’t a legal one—it is a cultural one.  Do we continue to grant 
creators the range of protection they have traditionally enjoyed for years112 under 
copyright law, or do we bow to the pressure of the growing software industry, and 
declare copyright protection an unwieldy burden of the past, which is hampering the 
cultural growth of the nation?  Again, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Eldred got it 
right—we can continue to vigorously protect original speech, but carve out a much 
more limited right of use, through doctrines like fair use, for appropriated speech. 
For these reasons, this sixth argument also warrants rejection. 
G.  Argument Seven:  The Idea/Expression Doctrine and the Fair Use Doctrine  
Have Become Too Rife with Uncertainty To Afford Meaningful Protection to Users. 
In general, the Copyright Critics are all very unhappy with the legislative and 
judicial view that the built-in limitations of copyright, in the form of the 
idea/expression dichotomy, and the fair use doctrine, offer sufficient protection 
                                                                                                                       
109 Id. 
110 Mahoney, supra note 10, at 2317. 
111 Id. at 2318–19. 
112 With respect to derivative rights, these have remained unchanged since 1870; and with 
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against violations of First Amendment and free speech rights.  Professor Baker offers 
a different approach as a better way to accommodate both copyright and free speech.  
His formula is as follows: 
From these examples, a first cut at free speech limits on copyright 
might be the following:  (1) a person has a right to engage in copying for her 
own use and for individualized noncommercial distribution; (2) she also has 
a right to distribute broadly at least if the copied speech is embodied in a 
communicative activity that is different that or goes beyond the use of the 
original author or publisher—a “transformative” use; (3) but this right to 
noncommercial use does not include a right to copy for the purpose of 
injuring a particular copyright holder or undermining the intellectual 
property system; and (4) a much closer case is where copying and 
distribution, even if itself an aspect of the copier’s communicative goals, has 
the likely consequence of largely destroying, not merely reducing, the 
market for authorized copies of the copyrighted material.  In this fourth 
case, limitations on copying may be appropriate, but the First Amendment 
issue is not entirely clear.113 
Professor Baker’s suggestion that noncommercial uses should be allowed under 
the First Amendment fails to consider the point raised in fair use analysis that even 
a noncommercial use can damage the market for the copyright holders work.  One 
who floods the market with copies of a work—say by buying a copy of Harry Potter, 
and making and giving away copies, adversely affects the market even if their use is 
noncommercial.  Professor Baker’s assertion that noncommercial uses do not 
significantly affect owner’s economic uses is belied by the Napster experience.114  
Napster did not charge anyone for the downloads—but the music business clearly 
was hurt.115  Professor Baker’s characterization, in 2002 when he wrote his article, 
that the reality of the ease of digital copying would not lead to dramatic undermining 
of value is directly contradicted by Napster, and the terrible losses the motion picture 
business continues to suffer as a result of worldwide piracy of motion pictures, a 
problem that has become more acute now that movies can be stored in digital 
formats. 116 
Professor Baker makes another suggestion that would also have a negative 
impact on the value of literary works: “Of course, allowing free digital libraries to 
post copies of materials without permission from copyright holders may be wise social 
                                                                                                                       
113 Baker, supra note 14, at 918–19. 
114 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with 
the trial court, which rejected Napster’s contention that an MP3 file exchange is a noncommercial 
use protected from infringement actions by 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006)). 
115 Id. at 1018. 
116 Baker, supra note 14, at 913.  Professor Baker expressed this view as follows: 
For instance in music, new methods of distribution may merely reconfigure which 
musical talents are most advantaged—possibly creating a broader and more 
egalitarian distribution of rewards for musicians as the changed environment 
results in payment coming through means other than sale of copies, especially 
through payment for live performances. 
Id.  The harsh reality of the costs of live performances and road tours for artists renders this 
prospect unlikely. 
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policy.”117  This is outrageous.  At present, public libraries must pay for books, and 
only copies for the blind are allowed without compensation.  Why should digital 
libraries be able to do what hard copy libraries cannot do?  This suggestion also fails 
to acknowledge that public libraries are, in the publishing industry, one of the main 
purchasers of hard copy books—eliminating that market will not be helpful in the 
development and publishing of new writers. 
Professor Netanel also is critical of what he characterizes as an expansion of the 
scope of derivative works.  In support of his view, however, he cites only two 
peripherally related cases for this proposition that under current derivative works 
analysis: 
“[S]peech that copies from an existing work at a quite high level of 
abstraction, containing no identity or even close similarity of work or 
graphic, but only a resemblance of style and overall aesthetic appeal, may 
well be deemed to constitute the appropriation of existing expression and 
thus run afoul of the copyright holder’s rights.118 
From here, he argues that the idea/expression dichotomy has become a muddied 
standard that provides little protection for users of works currently under copyright 
protection.  Noting that Courts may have differing views of what is idea and what is 
expression, he asks: “[H]ow are speakers to know whether their speech is infringing 
reproduction or permissible reformulation of existing expression?”119  This brings to 
mind the confusion which has existed for over thirty years regarding how to define 
“obscenity” under the Miller120 standard—while the vagueness of that standard has 
yielded a series of difficult decisions, the lack of certainty it presented and still 
presents for the publishers of adult-oriented material has merely been an issue for 
them to adjust to and deal with—and has not led to any significant negative impact 
on that industry—leading to the suspicion that speakers will also be able to figure 
out, in most cases, the difference between appropriating an idea, versus an 
expression. 
On the subject of fair use, Professor Netanel decries the fact that the burden of 
proving that the infringed work does not adversely affect the market for the work 
falls on the shoulders of the infringer.121  Again he fails to offer any empirical 
evidence to suggest that this placement of the burden, on the infringer to defend 
his/her actions, has in any significant way, impaired the creative process of artists or 
the public at large. 
In further comments regarding the fair use doctrine, Professor Netanel argues 
for revisions to the manner in which the doctrine is applied.  He asserts that so long 
as the defendant’s work is a “highly effective commentary on the original,” it should 
be permitted even if it competes in the market for derivative works based on the 
                                                                                                                       
117 Id. at 918. 
118 Netanel, supra note 15, at 18. 
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120 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  The standard used in the Miller case to determine 
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original work.122  He does not offer any examples of such a situation, and frankly it is 
hard to imagine one where the criticism or commentary is competitive in the 
market—parody is the likely candidate here, however many parodies have 
successfully been allowed publication, relying both on the fair use doctrine, and the 
more recently developed jurisprudence allowing parodies to be published if they are 
transformative in nature.123  
Professor Netanel goes on to suggest that once a defendant shows a colorable 
claim of fair use, the burden should shift to the plaintiff to prove market harm, 
rather than remaining with the defendant to show no harm.124  He argues that this 
change is needed because “[t]oday’s market-centered fair use doctrine places the 
defendant in the onerous position of proving a negative:  that the allegedly infringing 
use and other possible uses like it will not even harm a market, including a market 
for derivative works, that the copyright holder has no concrete plans to exploit.”125 
He offers no examples of this alleged problem, and certainly some computer era 
cases suggest that courts already require this kind of a showing for a plaintiff to 
prevail.126  This proposal ignores a central fact of most, if not all, fair use defense 
cases.  The defense is raised because the plaintiff has a fairly strong case showing 
infringement—so the defendant utilizes fair use (along with an attack on the validity 
of the copyright claim) in an effort to avoid liability.  Is it not a valid doctrine to 
require a defendant in that position to carry the burden of proving the defense they 
raise? 
Finally, Professor Netanel proposes that where a defendant presents a “colorable 
but unsuccessful claim of fair use,” courts should limit damages awarded against 
such defendants to the amount of a reasonable license fee instead of enjoining use.127  
This “solution” carries with it the same danger of similar solutions offered in the 
patent litigation realm.  If the sole liability exposure is limited to a reasonable license 
fee, this will greatly reduce infringement litigation, and provide incentive for 
infringers to carry on with their infringing behavior, especially in cases where a 
requested license has been denied—the defendant who was willing to pay the license 
but was denied will simply go ahead and infringe, since their liability exposure will 
be limited to what they were willing to pay anyway.  A better approach is to use the 
reasonable value of the license as part, but not the entirety, of the basis for the 
calculation of applicable damages.  
When considering the merit of this argument as to fair use, it is also worthwhile 
to consider that with a creative approach, the difficulties presented by a denial of 
access to a particular work for commercial purposes does not necessarily mean that 
the creative desires of the author must be frustrated.  By way of example, I offer the 
following two anecdotes from my own practice: 
1. In my capacity as counsel for the San Francisco International Film 
Festival,128 I was told of the Festival’s creative response to a copyright issue.  In 
1985, the Festival, after a hiatus of a few years, was reinstated to active status.  To 
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celebrate its return, the Festival directors sought permission to include in their 
annual advertising trailer, run before each screening and on local television, a clip of 
the original Frankenstein motion picture, specifically the scene where Dr. 
Frankenstein (played by Colin Clive), after what he thought was a failure to animate 
his creature with a lightening strike, pounded on the creature’s chest, exhorting it to 
come alive.  The Festival wanted to use this clip to set the stage for its catchphrase: 
“Coming Alive in ’85—the San Francisco Film Festival Returns.”  The studio 
controlling the rights to the film—despite the nonprofit nature and long history of the 
Festival, declined to grant a license, asserting that the film had been, at that point, 
overexposed.  What to do?  The Festival staff came up with an alternative approach.  
They approached Mel Brooks for permission to use a scene from Young Frankenstein, 
in which a similar scene, using the original movie’s lab equipment, was performed by 
Gene Wilder, as Dr. Frankenstein, and Peter Boyle, as the monster.  The permission 
was granted and the trailer was lauded as a great success. 
2. On another occasion, clients of mine were producing an original play for a 
small local theater about life in the United States circa the 1950s.  The opening scene 
involved two children watching a small black and white television on which an 
episode of I Love Lucy was playing.  The rights to license and show the clip were too 
expensive for the theater company, and since this was a commercial venture, the 
successful use of the fair use doctrine could not be guaranteed.  Again, the 
intervention of the creative spirit solved the problem—by turning the television set 
away from the audience and moving the children to a position facing the audience, 
the playwright then had an actor voice the traditional starting dialogue of the show, 
“Lucy, I’m home!”, and the idea was embodied without the need for the use of the 
expensive clip. 
I am not suggesting, by these examples, that all license and fair use issues can 
be similarly solved—however these instances are indicative of the fact that with 
creative people, solutions can often be found that do not require the use of a specific 
piece of copyright protected material in order to complete an expressive work. 
In sum, the Critics’ argument that the idea/expression doctrine and the fair use 
doctrine have become too rife with uncertainty to afford meaningful protection to 
users appears to lack merit—there is little empirical evidence to support the view, 
and many examples contra to it. 
II.  A REASONABLE APPROACH FOR CHANGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW—AN ANALYSIS  
OF THE ORPHAN WORKS REPORT AND ACT OF 2006 
In many instances, the Critics’ solution to the need for some revision of the 
copyright law is to apply the proverbial elephant to swat the fly.  As Professor 
Mahoney points out, Professor Lessig’s proposed solution is a return to the pre-1976 
opt-in system, accompanied by a return to the formalities of copyright renewal and 
formal notice that the 1976 Act eliminated.129  In response to this proposal, she notes:  
What Lessig neglects to mention is that all formalities impose burdens, and 
that those burdens are experienced most keenly by the inexperienced and 
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uneducated.  While it is by no means definite that the costs of more 
fomalities would outweigh the benefits, Lessig should at least acknowledge 
that corporate copyright holders are likely to have a much easier time 
negotiating the system than the lone individual creator, and that a turn to 
more formalities would bestow an advantage on none other than the “Big 
Media” interests Lessig abhors.130 
One concern that Professor Lessig focused on in his arguments in the Eldred 
case, the problem of “orphan works,” did generate interest in Congress.  That interest 
was expressed via requests from Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy131 and 
Congressman Lamar Smith,132 directed to the Copyright Office, that the matter be 
studied and that proposed solutions be offered. 
A.  The Copyright Office’s Methodology Used in the Preparation  
of the Orphan Works Report 
In response to these requests, Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, and her 
staff, prepared and issued a Notice of Inquiry (“Notice”) regarding the orphan works 
issue.133  The Notice sought written comments from all interested parties as to 
“whether there are compelling concerns raised by orphan works that merit a 
legislative, regulatory or other solution, and what type of solution could effectively 
address these concerns without conflicting with the legitimate interests of authors 
and right holders.”134 
By framing the issue in this manner, the Copyright Office (“Office”) set the tone 
for the investigation it would conduct, and the Report on Orphan Works (“Report”)135 
it subsequently issued—and that tone was one of balance.  The Office recognized that 
the interests of those who sought greater ease of access to, and use of, orphan works 
might conflict with the interests of copyright owners, their heirs, and assignees to 
retain control over their rights, and to avoid a return to the level of formalities that 
marked the pre-1976 copyright legal regime that had been the source of frequent loss 
of those rights through a failure to adhere to those formalities. 
Persons interested in submitting comments were asked to do so within a two 
month period, and were also offered an opportunity to submit reply comments in 
direct response to the written comments received.136  The Notice provided readers 
with a concise background section explaining how the problem of orphan works arose 
                                                                                                                       
130 Id. 
131 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
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as a by-product of the shift from an opt-in copyright protection system used in the 
1909 Act, to an opt-out system under the 1976 Act.137 
Since the term of copyright protection under the 1976 Act was for the life of the 
author plus fifty years, and was later extended to life plus seventy years,138 the 
concern arose that some works, whose owners could not be located, were effectively 
unavailable for use by third parties even though their owners appeared to no longer 
care to assert control over the works.  Because it was difficult and costly to locate 
those owners, and the opt-out system meant that the works were still protected, 
prospective users were reluctant to use the works for fear of being the subject of 
infringement litigation.  These works, no longer in use and whose owners could not 
be located to grant permission for others to use them, were deemed “orphan 
works.”139 
Noting that the uncertainty created by copyright in orphan works threatened to 
harm the public policy interest in the ability to create and disseminate works to the 
public, and citing approaches taken by other countries to address the problem,140 the 
Notice of Inquiry identified six specific questions it sought comment on—the 
responses to which would subsequently be included in a Report to be prepared by the 
Office and submitted to Congress for consideration.141 
The Notice of Inquiry generated 721 initial comments, and 146 reply comments, 
over a period of four months.142  The comments were submitted by a diverse array of 
individuals and interested organizations.   
The Copyright Office next published a Notice of Public Roundtables to seek 
additional commentary on four designated topics: 1) identification of orphan works; 
2) consequences of an orphan works designation; 3) reclaiming orphan works; and 4) 
                                                                                                                       
137 Id. at 3740.  Under the Copyright Act of 1909, rights holders were entitled, upon compliance 
with a formal registration process, to copyright protection for an initial period of twenty-eight years.  
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Kingdom.  Id. 
141 Id. at 3741–43.  The questions listed were: 1) nature of the problems faced by subsequent 
creators and users; 2) nature of “orphan works”: identification and designation; 3) nature of “orphan 
works”: Age; 4) nature of “orphan works”: publication status; 5) effect of a work being designated 
“orphaned”: and 6) international implications.  Id. 
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international issues.143  The roundtable discussions, held in Washington, D.C. and in 
Berkeley, California, drew fifty-eight participants, primarily from organizations 
interested in the orphan works issue.144   
Following the roundtable discussions, the Office met informally with seventeen 
groups and organizations in the fall of 2005 to allow those organizations a requested 
opportunity to provide additional comments and responses.145  Throughout the 
process of receiving these comments, responses, and conducting the roundtables and 
meetings, the Office staff was incorporating this data into a draft report to be 
published. 
On January 23, 2006, Register Peters delivered the Report to Senators Leahy 
and Hatch.146  The 127 pages of text contained the most comprehensive analysis of 
the orphan works issue done to date.  The Report’s investigation and conclusions echo 
many of the issues previously discussed in this article, and also demonstrate the 
balanced tone and nature of the Office’s response to this issue—indicative, I submit, 
of the Office’s overall approach to copyright concerns in the digital age.  For these 
reasons, the text of the report warrants further scrutiny.147 
B.  A Critical Analysis of the Orphan Works Report 
1.  The Overarching Goals 
In the Executive Summary section of the Report, the Office notes that 
throughout its extensive investigation process, it has kept in mind “three overarching 
goals”: 
First, any system to deal with orphan works should seek primarily to make 
it more likely that a user can find the relevant owner in the first instance, 
and negotiate a voluntary agreement over permission and payment, if 
appropriate, for the intended use of the work.  Second, where the user 
cannot identify and locate the copyright owner after a reasonably diligent 
search, then the system should permit that specific user to make use of the 
work, subject to provisions that would resolve issues that might arise if the 
owner surfaces after the use has commenced. . . . Finally, efficiency is 
another overarching consideration we have attempted to reflect, in that we 
believe our proposed orphan works solution is the least burdensome on all 
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144 ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 131, at app. C. 
145 Id. at app. D. 
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[7:1 2007] A Defense of Copyright’s Growing Pains 29
 
the relevant stakeholders, such as copyright owners, users and the federal 
government.”148 
As is always the case, our goals define and delineate the path we take to achieve 
them.  Here, the Office makes clear that the primary purpose of any orphan works 
process should be to first advance the view that the best resolution of these issues is 
one which brings the copyright owner and prospective user into direct contact with 
one another, to provide them an opportunity to negotiate, if possible, a mutually 
agreeable license or other form of rights transfer.149  By making this a priority, the 
Office signals that it is not embracing the idea that compulsory licenses with a fixed 
fee should be the principal vehicle for the solution of this problem.  At a later point in 
the Report, the Office confirms this perspective when it notes that any fixed fee 
structure is going to be deemed by some users to be too high, and conversely by some 
owners to be too low.150 
Secondly, by imposing a requirement that prospective users, in order to take 
advantage of an orphan rights exception to liability for statutory infringement must 
make a diligent effort to identify and locate the rights owner, the Office rejects the 
argument that the users’ interests in the untrammeled availability of works for re-
use should be paramount.151  The pro-owner orientation in this position is balanced 
by the Office’s determination that once a user complies with the diligent search 
requirement, an owner who surfaces after an orphan work is used has very limited 
remedies available—compensation is limited to a reasonable fee, and injunctive 
rights are also significantly limited.152  This is akin to the litigators’ characterization 
of what comprises a good settlement—one where no one is happy.  
This spirit of compromise and balance permeates the Office’s approach.  It is re-
emphasized in the final consideration—which the Office refers to as the need for 
efficiency in their approach to the orphan works problem, but is really 
acknowledgment that their task in fashioning a proposed solution is made far more 
challenging because of the need to balance the often competing interests of the three 
primary stakeholders here—the copyright owners, those who desire to use their 
works, and the federal government under whose authority each parties’ rights are to 
be regulated. 
With these goals in mind, the Report provides a detailed analysis of the orphan 
works issue, the relevant legal framework, both national and international, that 
must be considered in reaching any resolution of the issue, and a summary of the 
solutions proposed by the various commentators who participated in the Office’s 
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agreement over permission and payment, if appropriate, for the intended use of the work”). 
150 See id. at 84–85 (noting that one commentator “pointed out that where a compulsory license 
already existed in the copyright law for a type of use (e.g., the section 115 license), then the orphan 
work amount should match the compulsory rate”). 
151 Id. at 8 (setting out the “basic qualification the user of the orphan work must meet—he 
must perform a ‘reasonably diligent search’ and have been unable to locate the owner” of the 
copyrighted work). 
152 Id. at 11 (explaining that once a “user meets his burden of demonstrating that he performed 
a reasonably diligent search,” then the owner’s remedies would be limited to “only reasonably 
compensation for the use” and limited injunctive relief). 
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study. 153  The Report concludes with the Office’s recommended solution, 
representing the Office’s best effort at synthesizing the commentaries into a balanced 
conclusion.154  The outcome of this effort is not yet certain as of this writing, and for 
that reason this analysis is offered as a contribution to that ongoing dialogue. 
2.  “Orphan Works” Defined, and the Issues Presented 
The Report offers a concise definition of what constitutes an “orphan work,” and 
what is outside the definition: “The term certainly must mean what it implies:  that 
the ‘parent’ of the work is unknown or unavailable.  Therefore works whose owners 
are known, and situations involving those works, do not fit this definition and are not 
the subject of this inquiry.”155 
The Report notes that the inability to identify or locate the owner of the work 
creates uncertainty for the prospective user.156  This uncertainty may be addressed 
by reliance on one of the exemptions or limitations to copyright, however the user 
faced with this situation cannot, in the present state of the law, reduce the 
possibility, however remote, that the owner may surface at a date after the work has 
been used, and commence a claim for infringement damages and/or injunctive 
relief.157 
Prospective users seeking to identify and locate copyright owners confront a 
series of obstacles to success, the primary ones being listed by the Report as: “(1) 
inadequate identifying information on a particular copy of the work; (2) inadequate 
information about copyright ownership because of a change of ownership or a change 
in the circumstances of the owner; (3) limitations of existing copyright ownership 
information sources; and (4) difficulties researching copyright information.”158 
While sympathizing with the plight users face in trying to identify and locate 
owners of different kinds of works (noting, for example, that photographs often 
present a daunting challenge as they often contain no authorship data whatsoever), 
the Report also points out that “[o]ther comments suggest that for many searches 
abandoned at an early stage, the user would have found the right-holder with 
slightly more effort.”159  This comment foreshadows the ultimate recommendation of 
                                                                                                                       
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 98. 
155 Id. at 34.  The Report notes modestly that it does not intend to present a “categorical 
definition.”  Id.  However, it does distinguish orphan works from works that are “out of print,” noting 
that the latter phrase refers to the commercial exploitation status of a work, which may have 
occurred because the owner no longer exists or has simply chosen to no longer market the work.  Id. 
at 34 n.68.  The Report points out that while it is sometimes the case that out of print works are also 
orphan works, it is not uniformly so.  Id. 
156 Id. at 119 (stating “users who would like to create derivative works based on orphan 
works . . . stressed the fear of an untimely injunction . . . provides enough uncertainty that many 
choose not [to] use the work”). 
157 Id. at 15.  The exemptions and limitations referred to include the fair use doctrine, the 
defense arising from the idea/expression dichotomy, or the term limits of copyright.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 
101, 107 (2006). 
158 ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 131, at 22. 
159 Id. at 33 (citing the example of a search for the estate of illustrator Roger Hayward, 
abandoned after reaching an initial dead-end, but revived and successfully completed using 
Internet-based tools, which yielded a consent to use license in a matter of a few days). 
 
[7:1 2007] A Defense of Copyright’s Growing Pains 31
 
the Report that users be required to expend a diligent effort to identify and locate 
right-holders as a condition of being afforded the protection offered by any orphan 
works statute.  The devil is always in the details, and a considerable effort is devoted 
by the Report in determining what will comprise a “diligent effort.”160 
The authors of the Report also note that many of the comments they received 
described situations which, on further consideration, were not actually orphan works 
problems, but rather raised issues relating to the response, or nonresponse, of 
identified owners—a problem outside of the scope of the orphan works issue: 
These include situations where the user contacted the owner, but did not 
receive permission to use the work, either because the owner did not 
respond to the request, refused the request, or required a license fee that 
the user felt was too high. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . These issues are outside the scope of this inquiry because in such 
cases the copyright owner can be identified and located, and thus the 
question of the use of the work is left to the negotiation between the owner 
and the user, or the application of an existing exemption to copyright, and 
not any proposed solution to the “orphan works” problem.161 
Here again, the Office makes it clear that where the right-holder can be 
identified and located, the parties are on their own regarding the terms and 
conditions under which use of a work may be made.  Except for the exemptions and 
limitations allowed under copyright law, the federal government has chosen not to 
interpose itself further into the economic relationship between owners and users.  No 
doubt this was a disappointment for those advocates in the user community who saw 
in the Notice the opportunity to lobby for a greater government role, with a 
concomitant diminution in the right of owners to set the terms of use of their work—
however it appears that the Office concluded that to increase that governmental 
involvement would be contrary to the Article I, Section 8 constitutional mandate that 
the goal of intellectual property policy is to promote creativity by granting rights to 
the authors of works—and not to the users of those works.162 
The Report further categorizes the user population, dividing it into four separate 
groups: 
In our view most of the uses described fall into four general categories: (1) 
uses by subsequent creator who add some degree of their own expression to 
existing works and create a derivative work; (2) large-scale “access” uses 
where users primarily wish to bring large quantities of works to the public, 
usually via the Internet; (3) “enthusiast” or hobbyist uses, which usually 
involve specialized or niche works, and may also involve posting works on 
the Internet; and (4) private uses among a limited number of people.  It is 
                                                                                                                       
160 Id. at 71–79 (discussing proposed solutions to the issue of defining a “diligent effort”). 
161 Id. at 2, 22. 
162 See generally supra text accompanying note 80. 
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important to keep these categories in mind when considering any proposed 
solution to the orphan works problem so that the proper balance between 
removing unnecessary obstacles to productive uses of the work and 
preserving the interests of authors and copyright holders can be struck by 
such a solution.163 
It seems fair to say that of these four categories, only the first one, those who 
seek to use works for the purpose of creating derivative works, involves a further 
creative element building upon the original work.  The other three categories appear 
to be users who wish to copy and distribute the original work, for a variety of 
purposes, without adding anything of creative value to the work.  A missing element 
in the Report is a statistical breakdown of how many users fall into each of these 
categories, and in particular, how many of the proposed users seek the right to use 
these orphan works for the purpose of creating derivative works.  
Underlying this question is the assumption, which is certainly likely to draw a 
challenge, that the constitutional mandate supporting copyright is oriented to the 
protection of the rights of authors, rather than of distributors, and that in 
considering the rights of each group, the balance should swing in favor of creators’ 
rights.  Where this analysis gets complicated, of course, is in the situation where the 
owners of copyright protected material are not the authors, but instead are heirs, or 
business entities, that have acquired the ownership rights from those original 
creators.  In that situation, the argument that the rights of the owners are superior 
to the rights of the users becomes more problematic.   
However, it is my view that the balance should still swing in the owners’ 
direction, since those who acquire the rights from the original author, in one way or 
another, are still parties from whom the author derived some benefit from, or in the 
case of heirs, provided some incentive for the author to create (i.e., for the right to 
pass on the benefits of their creations to their heirs).  The same cannot generally be 
said of the users, from whom the authors derive no benefit. 
Having provided a definition of both the term “orphan works” and the nature of 
the problem the term refers to, the Report next considers the legal background 
through which the issue must be viewed.  While not all of this portion of the Report is 
relevant to this article,164 several sections are of importance, and warrant discussion. 
 
                                                                                                                       
163 ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 131, at 23. 
164 See id. at 44–52.  Section IV.B. of the Report is entitled Provisions in U.S. Copyright Law 
That Relate to Orphan Works.  Id.  Subsection IV.B.1. focuses on Section 108(h) (library and archive 
rights to reproduce works in their last twenty years of protection as extended by the CTEA).  Id. at 
45–46.  Subsection IV.B.2 focuses on Section 115(b) (compulsory licensing of nondramatic musical 
works.)  Id. at 47–49.  Subsection IV.B.3 focuses on Section 504(c)(2) (limiting infringement 
remedies based on the user’s knowledge and the reasonableness of the user’s beliefs).  Id. at 49–50.  
Subsection IV.B.4 focuses on Sections 203, 304(c), and 304(d) (termination provisions which contain 
procedures for effecting termination of rights where the owners cannot be located).  Id. at 50–52.  
While these sections, and the discussion of them in the Report, provide useful legal background for 
the purposes of the Report, they are not relevant to the scope of this article, and for that reason are 
not further discussed herein. 
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3.  How the 1976 Copyright Act Created the Orphan Works Problem and How 
International Considerations Limit the Solution 
The first of these sections deals with the historical factors that affect the orphan 
works problem.165  The Report notes that the problem of orphan works was in a 
significant respect, created by the omnibus revision to U.S. copyright law via the 
Copyright Act of 1976.166  Among many other changes, the term of copyright was 
changed by that revision from an initial term of twenty-eight years, followed by a 
renewal term of an additional twenty-eight years, which had been the term 
throughout most of the history of the Copyright Act of 1909, to a single term 
consisting of the life of the author, plus fifty years.167 
While this change had the positive effect of curing the formality driven 
frequency of forfeitures under the 1909 Act due to failure to register, renew or attach 
notice, which served as a “trap for the unwary,” an unfortunate side effect was that a 
significant number of works were granted copyright protection for a period longer 
than may have been valuable to their owners, or which allowed their owners to 
become more difficult to identify and/or locate.  The authors of the Report felt it 
necessary, as do I, to note that Congress did not ignore this concern, but rather 
decided to incur the risk of harm to users that might flow from this change in 
approach, which was explained in the legislative analysis of the Act, as follows: 
A point that has concerned some educational groups arose from the 
possibility that, since a large majority (now about 85 percent) of all 
copyrighted works are not renewed, a life-plus-50 year term would tie up a 
substantial body of material that is probably of no commercial interest but 
that would be more readily available for scholarly use if free of copyright 
restrictions. 
It is true that today’s ephemera represent tomorrow’s social history, 
and that works of scholarly value, which are now falling into the public 
domain after 29 years, would be protected much longer under the bill.  
Balanced against this are the burdens and expenses of renewals, the near 
impossibility of distinguishing between types of works in fixing a statutory 
term, and the extremely strong case in favor of a life-plus-50 system.  
Moreover, it is important to realize that the bill would not restrain scholars 
from using any work as source material or from making “fair use” of it; the 
restrictions would extend only to the unauthorized reproduction or 
distribution of copies of the work, its public performance, or some other use 
that would actually infringe the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.  The 
advantages of a basic term of copyright enduring for the life of the author 
and for 50 years after the author’s death outweigh any possible 
disadvantages.168 
                                                                                                                       
165 Id. at 41–44. 
166 Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 16. 
167 Id. § 302(a). 
168 ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 131, at 43–44 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 136 (1976)). 
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It is clear that the drafters of the 1976 Copyright Act could not have anticipated 
that the digital revolution would greatly change the ease with which material could 
be copied and that the Internet would make distribution of content available for vast 
amounts of material at a keystroke.  Would they, had they possessed that awareness, 
have declined to make the change in term and formalities?  I doubt it.  Central to 
their justification is the fact that the creative users of works still had, and still have, 
recourse to fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy, as well as other alternatives, 
to allow a means to use the works, and it is those needs, as opposed to the needs of 
distributors, which are paramount in the constitutional grant of intellectual property 
rights in Article I, Section 8.169 
As the Report notes, one of the other principal motivations behind this revision 
was to bring the United States into harmony with the prevailing law in the 
international copyright community, which is the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works.170  There is a strong policy in Berne favoring a 
prohibition against formalities being required as a condition precedent to the grant of 
copyright protection.171  By becoming a signatory to Berne in 1988, the United States 
committed itself to retain the formality-free approach to copyright embodied in the 
1976 Act, and to eschew a return to the formalities that were a hallmark of the 1909 
Act.  
As the Report notes, the effect of this with respect to orphan works is that any 
proposed legislation to address the problem cannot include a solution dependent on a 
reinstatement of formalities, such as requiring authors to participate in an address 
registry, since any such formality would violate Berne’s prohibition.172  While 
legislation could be narrowly tailored to limit its impact only on copyright owners of 
U.S. works, and thereby avoid violating Berne, the Report cautions that such an 
effort would lead to unnecessary complication in copyright law, and would exclude “a 
large class of works for which locating the copyright owner is often very difficult.”173 
                                                                                                                       
169 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
170 ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 131, at 42 (stating the copyright law revisions in 1976 and 
1998 were “important steps toward the United States’ assumption of a more prominent role in the 
international copyrights community” and the “changes harmonized U.S. copyright law with 
prevailing international norms”); see also Berne Convention, supra note 47.  The United States 
accession to Berne is reflected in the Berne Convention Implementation Act.  Berne Convention 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
171 Berne, supra note 47, at art. 5(2) (stating “[t]he enjoyment and exercise of these rights shall 
not be subject to any formality . . .”).  Various commentators have noted that the definition of 
“formalities” prohibited by Berne is fluid and expansive:  
Formalities are any conditions or measures—independent from those that relate 
to the creation of the work . . . or the fixation thereof . . . without the fulfillment of 
which the work is not protected or loses protection.  Registration, deposit of the 
original or a copy, and the indication of a notice are the most typical examples.   
ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 131, at 60 (citing MIHALY FICSOR, GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT AND 
RELATED RIGHTS TREATIES ADMINISTERED BY WIPO 41, ¶ BC-5.5 (2004)).  Another commentator 
stated “[f]ormalities are ‘everything which must be complied with in order to ensure that the rights 
of the author with regard to his work may come into existence.’”  Id. at 60 n.152 (quoting the 
German delegate at the 1884 Diplomatic Conference (citing SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE 
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORK: 1886–1986 222 (1987))). 
172 See ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 131, at 59. 
173 Id.  The Report notes further that such an approach “discriminates against United States 
copyright owners and their works.” Id.   
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4.  Alternative Approaches in the Law 
 
The Report notes that while the problem of orphan works has not yet been 
addressed with sui generis legislation, there do exist a variety of alternative 
approaches, some of which are derived from existing legal principles and statutes, 
which allow a user to go forward with their proposed use.174  The legal principles 
involved include the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.175 
The “idea/expression dichotomy” refers to the principle that copyright protects 
the expression of ideas, but not the ideas themselves.176  For users of an orphan 
work, this doctrine would allow the user to incorporate the idea embodied in the 
orphan work without exposure to infringement liability.  So if it is the idea, rather 
than its expression, which is what the user really needs for use, this section of the 
Act allows this kind of use to be made. 
                                                                                                                      
The authors of the Report acknowledge that it is not always an easy task to 
separate out the idea from its expression in a given work, a problem which can, in 
turn, still result in a chilling uncertainty that might impel a user to forgo the 
proposed use out of fear that an infringement claim will follow, despite their best 
efforts to effect the separation of these elements.177  The Report suggests, however, 
that this is a two-edged sword, which might also give an owner pause before 
commencing such a claim: 
In fact, the uncertainty over the application of the idea/expression 
dichotomy is faced by both copyright owners and copyright users, and thus 
users might benefit from the uncertainty if it prompts a copyright owner not 
to bring action against a work that attempts to copy only idea and not 
expression.178 
Regrettably, this seems unduly optimistic. My colleague, Professor William 
Gallagher, has written of the use of the threat of litigation as a tool deployed by 
owners for strategic purposes: 
Strategic intellectual property litigation refers to the use by 
intellectual property owners (and potential plaintiffs) of threats to sue and 
to the filing of lawsuits (regardless of whether there is any intent or 
 
174 Id. at 52 (stating “the Copyright Act and the marketplace for copyrighted works provide 
several alternatives to a user who is frustrated by the orphan works situation”). 
175 Id. at 53–56.  In addition to the legal doctrines discussed, the ORPHAN REPORT points out 
the users can also address the problem of an orphan work by copying only the elements in that work 
which are not protected by copyright, or by seeking a substitute work for which the user has 
permission to use.  
176 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (providing that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
or embodied in such work”). 
177 ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 131, at 54 (stating “the line between idea and expression is not 
fixed and bright, but a gray area that requires judgment and therefore entails uncertainty as to 
whether the user has taken only ideas and concepts”). 
178 Id. at 55. 
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commitment to fully litigate a case to a judgment in court) to give effect to 
ostensible intellectual property rights, where the primary goal is not 
necessarily to obtain a monetary award but to alter the behavior of the 
threatened target (and actual or potential defendant). A typical intended 
result is often to force the target to stop using the alleged intellectual 
property.179 
As noted previously, the Critics’ view is that users have an absolute free speech 
right to use the words or other artistic expression of authors for their own 
purposes.180  This view, coupled with the use by owners of strategic intellectual 
property litigation, makes it unlikely that the idea/expression dichotomy presents a 
very useful alternative to users faced with an orphan works problem.  The greater 
likelihood is that the proposed use does intend to incorporate the author’s protected 
expression, and the fear of a reprisal, even for strategic purposes, continues to 
militate towards a more comprehensive solution. 
The second statutory alternative approach cited in the Report is the fair use 
doctrine,181 which the Report notes is “one of copyright’s important First Amendment 
accommodations.”182  Fair use allows a user to make use of a portion of a protected 
work where the use is for a purpose such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching, scholarship, or research, and where the use does not significantly impair 
the market for, or marketability of, the underlying protected work. The statute 
contains a four-part test to be used to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the 
protection of the doctrine is to be afforded.183 
The Report notes that the case-by-case nature of the fair use doctrine carries 
with it, like the idea/expression dichotomy, a degree of uncertainty that may deter 
users from using the work in question, and again suggests that the two-edged nature 
of that uncertainty may provide some safety.184  However, the same problem of 
strategic litigation tactics also presents itself in the fair use context.  To a certain 
extent, fair use is even riskier than the idea/expression dichotomy, since reliance on 
the latter typically would mean the user would not be copying the exact expression 
used to embody the idea involved.  Users relying on fair use have characteristically 
copied the author’s expression as well, making a failure of the defense an almost 
certain exposure to intentional infringement liability and damages.  Once again, this 
level of risk is high enough to suggest that the availability of this defense is scant 
solace for prospective users of orphan works. 
                                                                                                                       
179 William T. Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and 
the Attenuation of Free Speech:  Lessons from the Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Doll War (and 
Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 610 (2005). 
180 See infra Section One, Argument 6: Free Speech Rights Include the Right To Use the Words 
or Other Expression of Another in Expressing Your Own Point of View. 
181 17 U.S.C. §107. 
182 ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 131, at 55 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003)).  
183 17 U.S.C. §107.  No single element of the four-part test is dispositive, and courts applying 
the test are required to consider all of the elements found in the statute.  See generally Campbell v. 
Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (finding error in the lower court’s determination that the 
commercial nature of the Two Live Crew musical group’s recording of an alleged parody of the Roy 
Orbison song Pretty Woman was per se not fair use, and remanding the case for consideration of the 
remaining elements of § 107). 
184 ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 131, at 55–56. 
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These limited alternative approaches did not convince either the commentators, 
or the Office, that they provide a sufficient basis for protection for the users of orphan 
works.  Consequently, the Office concludes its Report with a series of findings and 
recommendations for a sui generis legislative solution.185 
The Report first discusses the proposed solutions offered by the public comments 
it received, and then offers the Office’s conclusions and recommendations, explaining 
in that final section why it chose some, and rejected others, of the commentator’s 
proposals.186  I flip this order in the following discussion, summarizing first the 
Office’s conclusions and recommendations, and then noting the proposals they 
considered and rejected on the path towards their final determination. 
5.  Conclusions and Recommendations of the Office 
Based on the comments received, and their extensive analysis of the problem, as 
detailed in part herein, the authors of the Report offer four conclusions: 
1. The orphan works problem is real. 
2. The orphan works problem is elusive to quantify and describe 
comprehensively. 
3. Some orphan works situations may be addressed by existing copyright 
law, but many are not. 
4. Legislation is necessary to provide a meaningful solution to the orphan 
works problem as we know it today.187 
From these conclusions, the Report recommends that “[t]he orphan works issue 
be addressed by an amendment to Chapter 5 of the Copyright Act regarding 
‘Copyright Infringement and Remedies.’”188  The authors of the Report next address 
the significant challenges this proposed legislative solution will attempt to resolve. 
Beginning with the problem of identifying and locating the owners of orphan 
works, the proposed solution is to require prospective users to engage in a reasonably 
diligent search, and if that effort does not yield results, then the user should be 
entitled to “[a] benefit of limitations on the remedies that a copyright owner could 
obtain against him if the owner showed up at a later date and sued for 
infringement.”189  The authors note that the search effort requires user “good faith” 
in addition to diligence.190  The suggestion of commentators that particular sources of 
                                                                                                                       
185 Id. at 92. 
186 See id. at 69–92 (discussing proposed solutions offered by commentators); id. at 92–126 
(offering recommendations and conclusions drawn from conducting the report). 
187 Id. at 92–93. 
188 Id. at 93.  The ORPHAN REPORT concludes with a proposal for recommended statutory 
language, in the form of a new Section 514, to be entitled “Limitations on Remedies:  Orphan 
Works.”  Id. at 127. 
189 Id. at 95. 
190 Id. at 98. 
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data, such as publicly available records in the Copyright Office or other resources be 
deemed sufficient to meet the search criteria are rejected by the Report for a variety 
of reasons, including the fact that advances in technology are likely to produce 
different resources in the future, and that creating and maintaining central registries 
of data is a costly endeavor.191 
The Report next recommends that as a condition of use, prospective users 
include, to the extent it is available, attribution information in their use of the 
orphan works.192  Assuming a reasonably diligent search was conducted, and 
attribution, if possible, is provided, the Report recommends that the remedies 
available to a copyright owner who surfaces after the user has made use of the 
orphan work be limited both with respect to monetary and injunctive relief.193  These 
proposed limitations are perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Report, and 
have to date, proved the most difficult to generate universal support. 
As to monetary relief, the Report proposes that in a case where a user has made 
a reasonably diligent search for the owner, and after meeting with no success, 
proceeds to use the work and the owner subsequently surfaces and asserts a claim, 
that the monetary remedy by limited to only “reasonable compensation,” which is 
defined as “[t]he amount the user would have paid to the owner had they engaged in 
negotiations before the infringing use commenced.”194 
On its face, this recommendation seems eminently just.  However, the authors of 
the Report note that it had already generated strong objections during the comment 
phase of their work.195  On the one hand, nonprofit institutions which maintain large 
databases of orphan works, like photo archives, and museums, objected to the 
imposition of any fee for the use of the works.196  On the other hand, photographers 
and authors of other works that, on a per-work basis, do not command large purchase 
or license fees, strongly objected that the elimination of statutory damages for 
copyright infringement, coupled with the high cost of litigation and the lack of 
certainty regarding the right to recover legal fees, would effectively deprive them of 
any means of enforcing their copyright rights.197 
                                                                                                                       
191 Id. at 104–06, 109.  The ORPHAN REPORT notes that the treatment of copyright as personal 
property makes tracing ownership through heirs, bankruptcy proceedings, and other ownership 
transfer events more difficult.  Id. at 106.  This is one area where the IP Academy could be of 
service.  By encouraging colleagues who teach Wills and Trusts, Bankruptcy, and Business 
Associations and related courses to include units of study on the transfer of intellectual property, as 
well as continuing legal education programs to include a similar focus, members of the bar may 
become more aware of these issues in drafting related documents for their clients. 
192 Id. at 110. 
193 See generally id. at 115–26. 
194 Id. at 116 (citing the opinion of Judge Leval in Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 
2001)).  The opinion notes that using comparable license or sales fees is a way to prevent owners 
from seeking unrealistic compensation.  Id. n.383.  This is a not uncommon desire on the part of an 
owner who feels that their work has been “stolen” or who is unhappy not only with the fact of the 
unauthorized use, but also the circumstances or consequence of the use.  Id. at 116.  The authors 
note further that in the spirit of the Davis decision, the burden of proving that the work has any fair 
market value is on the owner, and the assertion may not be based on “undue speculation.” Id. 
195 Id. at 117. 
196 Id.  At best, many of these institutions were willing to only consider a nominal, capped fee of 
one hundred to five hundred dollars per work. 
197 Id. 
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This latter group was even more alarmed by the recommendation that for 
nonprofit entities, such as museums and archives, where the use of the work at issue 
was a noncommercial use and where the user ceases that use upon receipt of notice of 
an infringement claim, that no monetary relief should be available at all.198  As will 
be discussed in the next section, infra, these objecting parties played a significant 
role in the failure of Congress to adopt an orphan works law in the 2006 term. 
With respect to the availability of injunctive relief to prevent uses of orphan 
works, a now-powerful weapon in the owner’s arsenal, the authors of the Report, 
responding to the deterrent effect fear of an untimely injunction could have on an 
user’s willingness to use an orphan work, recommended two different limitations on 
that form of relief.199 
The authors of the Report summarize these proposals as follows: 
First, where the orphan work has been incorporated into a derivative work 
that also includes substantial expression of the user, then injunctive relief 
will not be available to stop the use of the derivative work in the same 
manner as it was being made prior to the claim of infringement, provided 
that the user pays reasonable compensation to the copyright owner.  
Second, in all other cases, full injunctive relief may be available, but the 
court must to the extent practicable account for and accommodate any 
reliance interest of the user that might be harmed by an injunction.200 
The authors argue that this two-part standard is justified because those users 
who have added original content to the orphan work have a greater reliance interest 
in being able to continue to make use of the resulting derivative work, whereas those 
users who have simply reproduced and marketed the orphan work may be properly 
enjoined from its further use, provided the court can, if possible, balance the harm 
they will suffer from the injunction.201 
The final page of the Report contains “Recommended Statutory Language” in the 
form of a proposal to amend the Copyright Act by addition of a Section 514, 
tentatively entitled Limitations on Remedies: Orphan Works.202  The proposed 
language serves to modify the infringement penalties set forth in Sections 502 
through 505 of the Copyright Act for those situations where a user has made a good 
faith diligent search, and where possible, has provided appropriate attribution.203  In 
such situations, the language provides, the remedies, both monetary and injunctive, 
available to the owner will be limited as aforesaid. 
The delivery of this exhaustive and well-researched Report moved the ball to 
Congress’s court, where the issue of whether legislation to address the orphan works 
problem could be successfully developed and implemented. 
                                                                                                                       
198 Id. at 118. 
199 Id. at 119–20.  While pointing out that the actual likelihood of an orphan work owner 
actually incurring the cost and going to the effort of obtaining an injunction is small, the threat of 
such a step is still enough of a deterrent to prevent use.  Id. at 120 n.386 (quoting a statement made 
by Paul Slevan, Holtzbrinck Publishing, during the July 26 Roundtable). 
200 Id. at 120. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 127. 
203 Id. 
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6.  Congress Tries and Fails:  The Orphan Works Act of 2006 
On May 22, 2006, Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas introduced a bill, entitled 
the “Orphan Works Act of 2006,”204 which presented Congress with a version of the 
Copyright Office’s proposed statutory language for dealing with the orphan works 
problem.  However, the proposed legislation differed from the Copyright Office’s 
proposed language in several important respects. 
The drafters of the bill felt it necessary to add a section of “Definitions; 
Requirements for Searches,” which both explains what is and is not a “reasonably 
diligent” search, and attempts to set a minimum threshold for what will constitute 
reasonable steps to accomplish that search.  These definitions provide as follows: 
(2)(B) REQUIREMENTS FOR REASONABLY DILIGENT SEARCH 
(i) For purposes of paragraph (1), a search to locate the owner of an 
infringed copyright in a work— 
(I) is “reasonably diligent” only if it includes steps that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to locate that owner in order to obtain 
permission for the use of the work; and  
(II) is not “reasonably diligent” solely by reference to the lack of 
identifying information with respect to the copyright on the copy or 
phonorecord of the work. 
(ii) The steps referred to in clause (i)(I) shall ordinarily include, at a 
minimum, review of the information maintained by the Register of 
Copyrights under subparagraph (C). 
(iii) A reasonably diligent search includes the use of reasonably available 
expert assistance and reasonably available technology, which may include, 
if reasonable under the circumstances, resources for which a charge or 
subscription fee is imposed.”205 
This section also contains a requirement that the Copyright Office “receive, 
maintain, and make available” information from a wide array of sources that may 
guide or assist prospective users as to how to conduct their “reasonably diligent” 
searches.206  The section includes five different types of “information” to be provided, 
including “best practices for documenting a reasonably diligent search.”207  In some 
respects, this subsection is a minefield of potential problems for users.  By offering a 
                                                                                                                       
204 Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter the Orphan Works 
Act of 2006]. 
205 Id. at 2–3. 
206 Id. at 3. 
207 Id.  Other sources of information the Copyright Office is expected to provide are vaguely 
defined—for example, subsection (C)(ii) of the Orphan Works Act of 2006 requires that the Office 
provide “other sources of copyright ownership information reasonably available to users,” leaving 
open and undefined the meaning and scope of what is “reasonably available.”  Id. 
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series of requirements that are to be met, or provide a minimum threshold for what 
constitutes a reasonably diligent search, the drafters of the bill deliver a potent 
argument to copyright owners in future orphan works litigation, since any user who 
fails to follow the steps recommended in the Act will be presumptively deemed an 
infringer due to the failure to conduct a “reasonably diligent” search.  A further 
concern arising from this set of proposed steps is whether their adoption would be 
viewed by the international copyright community as the kind of “formalities” 
proscribed by the Berne Convention.208 
The other significant addition in the bill to the Copyright Office’s recommended 
statutory language is the requirement that the owner of the orphan work bear the 
burden of proving what is “reasonable compensation” for the use, based on what a 
reasonable willing buyer and seller would have agreed to before the infringement 
began.209  Putting aside the fact that this definition disregards the noneconomic 
factors that affect the granting of rights to copyright protected work, as have been 
discussed infra,210 imposing yet another burden on copyright owners, one that could 
prove particularly onerous for institutional users (not all of which are nonprofit, or 
otherwise exempt from the obligation of reasonable compensation) further 
exacerbates the negative aspects of the bill, from the perspective of those users. 
The drafters of the Orphan Works Act of 2006 also offered, in Section 4 of the 
bill, the notion that there should be some means for addressing the needs of owners 
of copyrights in works that would not, in a “reasonable compensation” context, yield 
much income to their owners, making the pursuit of a claim economically 
unfeasible.211  The bill requires, in this Section 4, that the Copyright Office conduct 
an inquiry into remedies for small copyright claims to consider alternatives to the 
present statutory scheme requiring copyright infringement cases to be litigated 
through the U.S. district court system, a time-consuming and expensive process.212 
The Orphan Works Act of 2006, and the Copyright Office’s Report that led to its 
creation, generated strong reactions, many critical.  Commenting on the Report and 
proposed language on his blog, Professor Lessig wrote: 
The Copyright Office’s report is brilliant.  Its proposal is less brilliant.  
Its essence is that a work is deemed an “orphan” if you can’t discover the 
copyright owner after a “reasonably diligent search.”  If the work is deemed 
an orphan, then the copyright owner’s rights are curtailed.   
I think this both goes too far, and not far enough. 
Too far: . . . . In my view, photographers and other existing copyright 
holders are right to be outraged at the proposal.  Hiding under the cover of 
                                                                                                                       
208 See supra text accompanying notes 170–173. 
209 See Orphan Works Act of 2006, supra note 204, at 5. 
210 See generally discussion infra Section One, Argument Two: Copyright’s Principal Purpose Is 
To Provide Economic Benefits to Owners—The Property Right Created by Copyright Law Should 
Not Trump the First Amendment Rights of Users. 
211 See Orphan Works Act of 2006, supra note 204, at 5–6. 
212 Id.  Since this bill was not adopted, to date the Office has not, so far as I can determine, 
issued such a Notice of Inquiry. 
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“reasonably diligent search,” much of their work will be—unfairly—
threatened. 
Not far enough:  The trigger to the Copyright Office’s Orphan Works 
Remedy is whether a copyright owner can be found with a “reasonably 
diligent search.”  That standard is just mush.  The report outlines six 
factors to be considered in determining whether a search is “reasonably 
diligent.”  The effect of this complexity is simply make-work for lawyers.  
Libraries and archives will be unfairly burdened.  Users won’t be able to 
achieve any real security.213 
Professor Lessig offers an alternative to the Copyright Office proposal, which 
would limit the rights of owners to protection only as to old works.  For new works 
created after enactment, he proposes a fourteen-year initial grace period, after which 
new works would have to be registered with a private registrar to qualify for 
protection.214  Lastly, he exempts all foreign works and unpublished works from his 
alternative proposal.215 
It makes sense that Professor Lessig would exempt foreign works, since his 
proposal for a new “copyright maintenance procedure,” would in all likelihood be 
deemed the creation of a new system of formalities which are barred under Berne.216  
Presumably, he hopes to avoid a loss of the U.S. signatory status under Berne by 
exempting foreign owners from this proposal.  It remains to be seen whether this 
would be effective—however there does not appear to have been much interest from 
Congress in adopting Professor Lessig’s approach—so its impact on Berne does not 
appear likely to be tested. 
An even stronger negative response to the Orphan Works Act of 2006 was 
authored by representatives of the Advertising Photographers of America, an 
industry group.  In a March 15, 2006 letter to the Counsel for the Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property, they warned of disastrous 
consequences if the bill passed: 
If this amendment is enacted into law without significant revisions, it has 
the very real potential to destroy the businesses and livelihoods of 
thousands of artist, cost thousands of jobs, and result in a massive wave of 
litigation related to the use of orphan works.  In its current form, this 
amendment is a disaster in the making.217 
                                                                                                                       
213 Posting of Lawrence Lessig to Lessig Blog, Copyright Policy: Orphan Works Reform, 
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/003696.shtml (Feb. 1, 2007, 03:34 EST). 
214 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, AN ORPHAN WORKS MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENT 1 (2007), 
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/OWMR.pdf; see also Video File: Against the Current “Orphan 
Works Proposals” (Lawrence Lessig 2007), http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/Against_Web.mov 
[hereinafter Video File]. 
215 Video File, supra note 214. 
216 Id. (comparing his proposal with patent maintenance procedures). 
217 Letter from Jeff Sedik, Chief Advisor on Licensing & Copyright, APA, to Joe Keeley, 
Counsel for the Majority, and Shanna Winters, Counsel for the Minority, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property (March 15, 2006), 
available at http://www.asmp.org/news/spec2006/orphan_APAstatement.pdf. 
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Faced with this critical response, the bill stalled in Committee and was not 
presented to the Congress for action.218  It is presently being re-worked, in an effort 
to address some of the concerns of its critics.  In particular, and in response to the 
Section 4 call for a remedy to address the small copyright claim issue, a proposal is 
under discussion to create a form of federal small claims court where small dollar 
copyright claims, such as are likely to be made by photographers, could be 
adjudicated at significantly lower cost to those owners.  Another issue under 
discussion is the extent the bar on monetary damages for nonprofit users would be 
handled in the situation where a museum or other nonprofit reproduces an orphan 
work in an income-generating context, such as sales of merchandise bearing the 
work, sold in the museum store.219  It remains to be seen whether, and in what form, 
Congress will be able to successfully adopt a bill dealing with the orphan works issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The seven arguments discussed herein are not all of the arguments advanced by 
the Copyright Critics in support of their call for sweeping reform of the Copyright 
Act, and for a return to a limited term, more formalities, and the end of the opt-out 
structure of the law.  However, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, these seven 
arguments, central to the Critics’ position, provide little support for that viewpoint, 
and absent far more compelling evidence of a need for change, fail to make the case 
that U.S. copyright law has descended into madness and constitutional over-breadth.   
The conflicting array of viewpoints expressed over the orphan works 
amendment, despite the general consensus that this is a problem that needs to be 
addressed through new legislation, reflects that the task of amending copyright law 
is much more difficult that merely criticizing its effects from the safety of the 
Academy.  The real world mélange of differing interests, magnified a thousand-fold 
when the international context is folded into the mix, which it must be in a 
borderless digital age, reveals the difficulty of making any change to copyright law, 
and urges that future critics adopt a more balanced and nuanced understanding of 
these diverse stressors.  Copyright law remains a work-in-progress, but given the 
enormous pressure points brought to bear, it cannot be fairly said that its 
development is not being achieved, under the circumstances, in as reasonable a 
fashion as anyone can expect. 
On the contrary, it appears that in this age of the Internet, copyright has, by and 
large, adapted well once more to the challenge of changing technology.  Admittedly, 
there remain areas of concern, notably the fate of fair use under the DMCA, but the 
recent proposal of the Copyright Office and the Congress for the adoption of the 
Orphan Works Act of 2006 may be a hopeful sign that copyright law remains a vital 
and changing doctrine—and that with the application of a bit of reasonable change, 
will continue to be so for many years to come. 
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